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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS IN HEALTH ECONOMICS 
 
by 
 
Aigbokhai Unuigbe 
 
 
Advisor: Michael Grossman 
 
 
 
 This dissertation is motivated by changes in health and labor policies of the United 
States that have occurred over the last two decades. It examines how these policies as well as 
public programs affect behavior and outcomes. These programs and policies have the potential 
to impact behavior directly at the individual level and could also have indirect effects at the 
household level. In addition, the effects on healthcare use and health status are also examined. 
This dissertation consists of three chapters.  
 The first chapter looks at the effect of changes in Medicaid policy on legal immigrant 
parents in the United States. During the 1990s and early 2000s many states expanded Medicaid 
eligibility for parents particularly after the 1996 welfare reform. At the same time, welfare 
reform also put in place policies that limited the eligibility of recent legal immigrants for public 
programs including Medicaid. In this chapter the effects of these changes in Medicaid eligibility 
policy on the private and public health insurance coverage of immigrants as well as the overall 
insurance rate. It also looks at the effect on health care use and measures of health status. The 
findings indicate a significant increase in Medicaid coverage and an increase in the proportion 
insured overall with negligible crowd-out of private insurance. There is also an increase in the 
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use of health care services and improved health status particularly for foreign born citizens. In 
the case of longer tenure permanent residents, there is a diminished response to Medicaid 
eligibility changes possibly due to a ''chilling" effect.    
The second chapter evaluates the impact of the Healthy Start program on infant 
mortality outcomes at the county level. Prior studies have found that various policy changes 
and programs affected the US infant mortality rate over time. This chapter examines the effect 
of the Healthy Start program in parts of the United States on infant mortality rates. Using data 
from the CDC WONDER database as well as other sources the program is evaluated using 
synthetic control methods. The findings show that Healthy Start has been able to reduce infant 
mortality rate in certain areas, while it has been less effective in other sites. This could be due 
to each program site being separately run, although all programs have the same funding source.  
The third chapter examines the effect of changes in the minimum wage on adults and 
households with education levels. It exploits variation in the minimum wage to examine its 
impact on health and health care use. A large proportion of previous research on the minimum 
wage examines its employment effects. This chapter looks at a different dimension. Using data 
from the Survey for Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from 1996-2005 and 2010-2011, it 
estimates the effect of minimum wage variation on general health and health care use for 
adults with less than a high school education and also those of college educated adults, as well 
as their dependents. The results show an increase in the use of healthcare services for adults 
with less than a high school education as well as their dependents. There is no significant effect 
on those in the higher education group. 
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Chapter 1
Impact of Medicaid Policy Changes on Immigrant
Parents
Introduction
Immigrants are a substantial portion of the population in the United States and this
proportion has grown over time. The immigrant share of the U.S. population increased from
11.1% in the year 2000 to 12.9% in 2010 (Nwosu et al., 2014). However, a relatively large
percentage of this group, compared to native born citizens, is represented among those in
poverty and without health insurance. As of 1999, one-third of immigrants did not have
health insurance and 16.8% lived in poverty (Camarota 2001). This uninsured rate varies
by immigration status and length of stay. In the case of recent immigrants (noncitizens who
have lived in the United States for six years or less), 52% of those in this group had no health
insurance in 2003. In the same year, 43% of noncitizen immigrants with a longer tenure and
21% of naturalized citizens were also uninsured. This compares with a 15% rate for native
citizens (Kaiser Family Foundation 2004).
One of the possible major contributors to the relatively low rate of insurance for im-
migrants is the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA). This welfare reform legislation established new eligibility rules for various public
programs such as Medicaid. In addition to meeting all other requirements, recent immigrants
who were permanent residents had to have been in the U.S. for at least 5 years before they
could be eligible for federally funded Medicaid coverage. Immigrant citizens were not subject
to this additional constraint. In response to this change, a number of states provided health
coverage to some of these immigrants that were not eligible for federally funded Medicaid,
with state funds. This led to a situation where permanent residents were eligible for health
insurance in some states and not eligible in others.
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This study looks at the effect of being Medicaid eligible on health insurance coverage,
health care use, and the general health of immigrants. The study also estimates the level
of crowd-out and examines for evidence of “chilling effects”. The segment of the immigrant
population that is eligible for Medicaid coverage has evolved over time due to changes in
income eligibility levels as well as the differences in state sponsored coverage. In particular,
this study focuses on the effect for permanent residents and citizens who are parents of
dependent children (children below age 18). Using repeated cross sections from the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data, published by the United States Census
Bureau, the effect over the 1996-2004 period is examined. The sample consists of 2492 foreign
born citizens and 3252 permanent residents. The variation in eligibility across states and
over time is suitable for measuring the effects.
The results indicate a Medicaid take-up rate of 14.9-20.7 percentage points for the immi-
grant population made eligible for Medicaid. There is also minimal evidence of crowd-out.
The results for health care utilization show a general increase in the use of medical services,
while there is some evidence of an improvement in health status for foreign born citizens
in particular. The results for permanent residents provide evidence of a “chilling effect” on
Medicaid enrollment.
Previous Literature
A number of studies look at the effect of public insurance eligibility on the take up
of such insurance, as well as its effect on health insurance overall and any possible crowd
out effects on private insurance. Aizer and Grogger (2003) examine the effect of Medicaid
eligibility expansions to low income parents on health insurance coverage. They find that
these expansions increased Medicaid coverage of mothers and their children and had small
effects on private coverage. Busch and Duchovny (2005) also look at the effect of increasing
the income eligibility limits on Medicaid coverage of parents. In addition, they examine its
effect on health care utilization. The authors find an increase in the probability that the
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eligible adults are insured and an increase in the use of health care services. This rise in public
insurance coverage occurred in the aftermath of welfare reform which led to a decrease in
welfare caseloads. The decrease in caseloads could lead to a drop in Medicaid enrollment even
when these individuals might still be eligible due to administrative issues or unfamiliarity
with new procedures. Kaestner and Kaushal (2003) look at the effect of changes in the welfare
caseload on health insurance coverage of single mothers and their children. They find that
a reduction in the caseload led to a relatively small drop in Medicaid and overall insurance
coverage, and a rise in private coverage. These results show that Medicaid expansions were
still effective at increasing enrollment even in the aftermath of welfare reform. Studies of
eligibility expansions to children also find similar results. Lo Sasso and Buchmueller (2004)
look at the effects of expanding eligibility to children through the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP) and find an increase in coverage of 9% among those eligible.
There have also been studies with a focus on changes in public insurance eligibility and
its effect on the immigrant population in particular. Kaushal and Kaestner (2005) look
at the effect of 1996 welfare reform on health insurance coverage of foreign and U.S. born
families headed by women with lower levels of education. They find that welfare reform
adversely affected their health insurance coverage. Lurie (2007) looks at the effect of the
eligibility changes (due to welfare reform) on the health insurance coverage of children of non-
permanent residents. Lurie finds that the proportion of uninsured children of non-permanent
residents increased by 10 percentage points relative to the children of permanent residents.
Buchmueller et al (2007) examines the effect of SCHIP expansions on the insurance coverage
of children with foreign born parents and they find that this group has a similar take-up rate
as the children of native born parents. Bronchetti (2014) also looks at the effect of SCHIP
and Medicaid expansions on the insurance coverage of children with foreign born and native
born parents as well as its effect on health care use. She finds a higher degree of insurance
takeup among the children of immigrants than the children of the native born as well as
greater use of health care and some evidence of improvement in measures of health. This
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greater rate of take-up could be due to the lower rate of insurance coverage among children of
immigrants. The difference in results between the Buchmueller et al and Bronchetti papers
could also be due to a difference in the instrument used. Both papers use the simulated
eligibility instrument (which will be discussed further below) but Bronchetti incorporates
immigration status into the instrument. Bronchetti obtains similar results to Buchmueller
et al. (no significant difference between the take-up rates of children with native born
parents and children with foreign born parents) when immigration status is not included in
the construction of the instrument.
The “chilling effect”, which can be described as the indirect effects of a stricter or “icy”
policy environment (Watson 2014) on Medicaid enrollment of immigrants, has also been
studied. Kaushal and Kaestner (2005) find evidence of a “chilling effect” for foreign born
women. Lurie (2008) and Watson (2014) also provide evidence of a “chilling effect” for citizen
children of noncitizens. This is an indication of the far reaching effects of these policies post
welfare reform.
This paper contributes to this literature by examining the effects of changes in Medicaid
eligibility for immigrant parents on their receipt public and private insurance as well as its
effect on their health and health care use. The size of the crowd-out effect is estimated and
the presence of a “chilling effect” for adult immigrants is also discussed.
Background
The Medicaid insurance program was established in 1965. Historically, eligibility for the
program was limited to those receiving assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program, disabled adults receiving Social Security Insurance (SSI) and
the aged who qualified due to lower income. Over the following decades there has been an
evolution in Medicaid eligibility criteria for different groups such as lower income minors,
pregnant women, and lower income parents.
The eligibility expansions for pregnant women and children began in the 1980s. This
4
decade was characterized by a series of legislated state options and mandates that expanded
Medicaid eligibility for these groups. The pattern of legislation over this period could be
described as “initial federal permission to expand their programs, followed within a few years
with mandates for all states to cover these groups” (Gruber 2000). The most extensive of
these acts for pregnant women and young children were the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Acts (OBRA) of 1987 and 1989. OBRA 1987 gave states the option to provide coverage
for pregnant women and infants up to 185% of the poverty level. OBRA 1989 mandated
coverage of pregnant women and children under age 6 up to 133% of the poverty level. In the
case of older children (age 6-18), the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 mandated
coverage up to 100% of the poverty level for all those born after September 30, 1983.
In comparison, the early coverage expansions for parents did not keep pace with those
for children (Dubay and Kenney 2003). Historically, parents qualified for Medicaid coverage
if they also received cash assistance under the AFDC program. This led to limited Medicaid
enrollment by this group as the income eligibility standards for AFDC were relatively low.
The major expansions in eligibility for parents occurred after the passage of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996.
PRWORA replaced the AFDC program with the Temporary Assistance to Needy Fam-
ilies (TANF) program. It also severed the link between Medicaid and welfare receipt i.e.
eligibility for Medicaid and AFDC/TANF (welfare) were considered separately. Following
this delinking of Medicaid and welfare there were further expansions in Medicaid eligibility
for children. The most notable of these is the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP)
that was established in 1997. CHIP programs allowed states to provide health insurance
coverage to children from families with incomes above the Medicaid income eligibility level.
There were also expansions in parental eligibility after the 1996 welfare reform. With the
delinking of welfare and Medicaid in the 1996 reform, a new category for coverage known
as the family coverage or Section 1931 category was created. Under this coverage category,
states had to provide Medicaid coverage to families with children if they met the rules for
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eligibility that were in place on May 18, 1988. However, all states continued to provide
coverage to families that would have been eligible under the rules in effect on July 16, 1996
at a minimum (Broaddus et al 2002). Beyond that, states were also granted broad flexibility
to expand their income eligibility limits under this coverage category and a number of states
did so.
Another method used by states to expand Medicaid parental coverage was by the use
of research and demonstration (Section 1115) waivers. States could secure the Medicaid
Section 1115 waiver if they could demonstrate that the proposed eligibility expansion would
be budget neutral to the federal government. The two avenues (Medicaid Section 1931 or
Section 1115) were the two methods by which states expanded parental coverage after welfare
reform.
The welfare reform legislation of 1996 (PRWORA) also established new standards for de-
termining immigrant eligibility for publicly funded programs. It placed additional restrictions
on participation in these programs by immigrants beyond those faced by citizens. The law
distinguished between immigrants that were in the country before August 22nd 1996 (pre-
enactment immigrants) and those who arrived from that date onward (post-enactment im-
migrants). Pre-enactment immigrants were still eligible for coverage under federally funded
Medicaid, although this was at the option of individual states. On the other hand, post-
enactment immigrants were not eligible for federally funded Medicaid for their first five years
in the United States. After the five year wait, these immigrants are then eligible for coverage
at the option of the state. Naturalized citizens were treated the same as native born citizens
in determining Medicaid Eligibility.
Virtually all states continued to provide Medicaid coverage to pre-enactment immigrants.
For post-enactment immigrants, there is more variation across states in the choice to provide
coverage. For this group, there is no federal funding for Medicaid and so any coverage was
fully funded by states in the first five years. The coverage choices made by California, New
York, and Texas illustrate this variation across states and over time. California continued
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to cover post-enactment immigrant parents with state funds while New York did not begin
covering this group until 2001. Texas on the other hand never covered post enactment
immigrants.
Thus, in the case of immigrants there were two opposing forces; a general increase in
the medicaid income eligibility levels across states and additional enrollment restrictions.
Increases in income eligibility levels would tend to increase enrollment in Medicaid while
a more restrictive policy environment which would tend to decrease immigrant enrollment.
This article looks at the response of immigrant parents in particular due to their unique
circumstances to these changes in Medicaid eligibility.
Figures 1 and 2 show the change in proportion of the lower income population (those in
households with income equivalent to 200% of the poverty level) that are eligible for Medicaid
coverage and the change in the percentage covered by Medicaid. The figures indicate a
general rise in eligibility for this population particularly among foreign born citizens. In
1996, about 33% of the population was eligible and this proportion rose to 45% by 2004.
However this increase in eligibility does not lead to an initial rise in Medicaid coverage as
shown in figure 2. There is a fall in Medicaid coverage between 1996 and 2001 for permanent
residents, with a rebound in coverage by 2004. This drop in coverage could be due to changes
in methods of access for Medicaid and also the limitations placed on access to coverage post
welfare reform.
As discussed earlier, Kaushal and Kaestner (2005) study these changes in Medicaid access
due to welfare reform and indeed find a decrease in coverage for immigrants in the time
period immediately following reform compared to the pre-reform period. This paper focuses
on changes in eligibility only in the post reform time period.
Data
The primary data for this study is obtained from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). SIPP is a national sample of the civilian non-institutionalized popu-
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lation. It consists of panels which take place over four years. Data from the 1996, 2001 and
2004 panels is used. Each panel is a multistage stratified sample of the US population. An
individual is interviewed a maximum of 12 times over a four year period on core topics such
as family income, composition, and participation in various government programs over the
past 4 months. In addition, these individuals are also asked topical questions about certain
issues in some interviews. Thus, the core questions are asked in every interview (known as
a wave) while each set of topical questions is asked in selected waves. The topical modules
used in this paper are the Medical Expenses and Utilization of Health Care module and the
Migration History module. The Medical Expenses and Utilization Module contains informa-
tion on health care use and measures of general health. This topical module is administered
roughly once a year. The Migration history module contains information on the immigration
status of respondents as well as their date of arrival if foreign born. This topical module is
administered just once per panel so the immigration status of each individual is observed
just once for each panel. Thus, the analysis is limited to repeated cross sections.
The SIPP data used for this analysis consists of foreign born parents aged 18-64 currently
residing in the US. This gives a sample size of 5744 unique individuals, of which 2492 are
naturalized citizens and 3252 are permanent residents. Further analysis is also conducted
on the subset of the sample with income equivalent to 200% of the federal poverty level
or less. This subsample consists of 2918 individuals, with 942 naturalized citizens and 1976
permanent residents. Additional explanatory variables were also obtained from other sources.
For instance, unemployment rates by state and year were obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics website.
The data used for this analysis is limited to the 16 states with the majority of the
immigrant population in the United States. These are also the states that have the most of
the foreign born observations (84%) in the SIPP data. Table 1 shows the variation across
states and over time in parental income eligibility levels in 1996 and 2004 1. These eligibility
1Sources include Aizer and Grogger (2003), Busch and Duchovny (2005), Guyer and Mann (1999) and
publications by the Kaiser Family Foundation (2002, 2004)
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levels pertain to adults with minor children and who are not pregnant in the case of mothers
(pregnant women are eligible under a different category). Up until 1996, there was no
difference in the coverage available to citizens and permanent residents. Thus, permanent
residents were eligible on the same basis as citizens in the 1996 cross section. After the
1996 welfare reform there is variation in Medicaid coverage by state during the five year
bar. In 2004 for instance, states such as California, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and
Pennsylvania covered permanent residents during the bar while other states did not.
The descriptive statistics for the full sample are shown on Table 3. Those with a household
income that is at most 200% of the federal poverty level (defined here as the lower income
group) are more likely to be on Medicaid, less likely to have private insurance coverage or
have any insurance coverage at all. The lower group is also less likely to report very good
or excellent health and have lower levels of educational attainment. In terms of duration of
stay, the lower income group has spent less time in the US than the full sample. Table 4
shows the descriptive statistics for all immigrant parents by citizenship status. Lower income
permanent residents and citizens are more likely to be on Medicaid and less likely to carry
private insurance or have any insurance at all. Comparing across the two groups, permanent
residents are more likely to be uninsured and to be on Medicaid despite the restrictions due
to the five year bar. A smaller proportion of those in the lower income category report that
they are in very good health or better. Looking at educational attainment, the lower income
groups in general report less education than the full sample groups. Permanent residents
also report a shorter duration of stay in the U.S.
Emprical Specifications
This article looks at the effect of being eligible for Medicaid coverage on the take-up of
Medicaid, its effect on private insurance as well as on the overall insurance status of foreign
born citizens and permanents residents. Its effect on health and use of health care services
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is also examined. The model to estimate the outcomes of interest is shown below
Yijt = β1ELIGijt + β2Xijt + µj + ηt + ijt
where Yijt is the outcome variable for individual i in state j in year t. In the case of
the health insurance coverage, the outcome variable is a dummy variable for coverage by
Medicaid, private insurance or being uninsured. In the regressions for health and health
care use, the dependent variables include an index for general health and a dummy variable
for having had at least one medical provider(doctor, nurse or other medical provider) visit in
the last twelve months. These will be discussed in further detail below. The ELIG variable
is a dummy variable that equals one if individual i is eligible for Medicaid coverage in state
j during year t. Xijt is a vector of personal characteristics such as age, race, sex, household
income, employment status, state unemployment rate and its lag as a measure of general
macroeconomic conditions. The model also includes state fixed effects (µj) and year fixed
effects (ηt). The state fixed effects control for any state specific time invariant variables while
the time fixed effects control for year specific variables across states. All standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
Identification in the model comes from variation in the Medicaid eligibility for immigrants
parents within states over time and the variation in income eligibility limits. It is assumed
in this model that unmeasured variables that vary by state year are not correlated with the
Medicaid eligibility variable.
A potential problem with this estimation strategy is endogeneity bias. It is possible
that unobserved factors which affect Medicaid eligibility could be correlated with the out-
comes of interest (health insurance choices, healthcare utilization and measures of health).
It could be correlated with factors such as availability of insurance from other sources, earn-
ings ability, unobserved aspects of employment and unobserved health status (Buchmueller
et al 2015). For instance, poor individual health could affect income (due to reduced labor
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supply) thereby increasing the likelihood of eligibility for Medicaid. It would also lead to
a spurious positive correlation between eligibility and use of healthcare services. Another
likely possibility is that wages and employment benefits such as health insurance could be
correlated. In general, eligibility could be a function of individual and family characteristics
that may be correlated with demand for insurance and utilization of health services. Unob-
served factors which are affect eligibility for the Medicaid such as earnings ability, insurance
availability from other sources and job characteristics are likely to be correlated with the
outcomes of interest. It is also a possibility that individuals eligible for Medicaid may have
characteristics that affect their utilization and their health even after the inclusion of other
controls.
To tackle these issues, this article uses a simulated instrumental variable approach that
has been extensively used in prior literature2. To obtain the simulated IV, a random sample
of observations is drawn for each year. The random sample is run through a simulation
that computes the proportion of the sample that would be eligible for Medicaid in each
state based on its regulations. The fraction obtained for each state is then used as an
instrument for imputed Medicaid eligibility in a state. For instance, in the case of New
Jersey the proportion of the random sample that would be eligible for Medicaid under New
Jersey regulations is computed. This proportion is used as an instrument for the New
Jersey residents in the dataset. The same random sample is then subjected to the Medicaid
eligibility rules in Florida and the proportion eligible under Florida regulations functions as
the instrument. This process is followed for every state in the sample. The instrument will
vary with the regulatory environment in a particular state year and will be exogenous to
individual attributes, health, and health care use.
As noted in the background section, there were changes in policy that could lead to a
rise in Medicaid coverage (higher income eligibility limits) and others that could decrease
Medicaid enrollment (the institution of a five year bar) particularly for recently arrived
2Currie and Gruber (1996), Cutler and Gruber (1996), Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005), Losasso and
Buchmueller (2004), and Buchmueller et al (2007) for instance
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permanent residents. The instrumental variable estimate obtained would represent the “net”
effect of these policy changes. To obtain the effect of the five year bar policy, a difference-
in-differences estimation strategy is used. The model is shown below
Yijt = θ1PERMit + θ2POSTt ∗ PERMit + θ3Xijt + µj + ηt + ijt
where PERMit is a dummy variable indicating that individual i in year t is a recently
arrived permanent resident and POSTt is a dummy indicating observations in the post-
welfare reform period. The comparison group used is foreign born citizens, as they are
not subject to the five year bar. The coefficient of interest is θ2, which is an estimate of
the difference in outcomes between recently arrived permanent residents and foreign born
citizens in the period after the 5 year bar was instituted. A standalone parameter for the
POSTt variable is not estimated as it is not identified in the presence of state and year fixed
effects.
With these estimation procedures, the magnitude of crowd-out can also be estimated.
Crowd-out is defined as the extent to which expansions in Medicaid coverage reduce private
insurance coverage (Gruber and Simon 2008). Privately insured individuals that become
eligible for Medicaid due to expansions could decide to drop private insurance. This will
tend to depress the overall increase in health insurance coverage rates. Crowd-out in this
article as computed as the reduction in private insurance relative to the growth in public
coverage (private insurance/public insurance).
To summarize the estimation strategy, the variation variation in Medicaid policy over
time is used to examine its effect on public and private insurance coverage, crowd-out as
well as on health and health care use. The difference-in-differences estimates are used to
isolate the impact of the five year bar policy in particular on recently arrived permanent
residents, the group which is directly targeted by this policy.
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Results
Table 5 presents results for the effect of Medicaid eligibility on receipt of Medicaid, pri-
vate insurance coverage and being uninsured for the full sample. The top portion presents
the ordinary least squares results while the bottom panel shows the instrumental variable
estimates. The ordinary least squares (OLS) results show that being made eligible is as-
sociated with a 26.5 percentage point increase in the probability of Medicaid enrollment, a
29.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of private insurance coverage, and a 3.8
percentage point increase in the probability of being uninsured. As stated above the OLS
estimates are likely to be biased. The instrumental variable (IV) estimates are shown in
the bottom panel of table 5. The IV estimates show a 20.7 percentage point increase in the
probability of Medicaid coverage for those made eligible. It also shows a 19.5 percentage
point decrease in the probability of being uninsured and a 1.5 percentage point decrease in
the probability of private insurance coverage, although these estimates are not statistically
significant. The results for those with income 200% of the poverty level and below is shown
on Table 6. The OLS estimates show a 17.1 percentage point increase in Medicaid coverage,
a 10.5 percentage point decrease in private coverage and a 5.2 percentage decrease in the rate
of the uninsured. Examining the IV estimates for this group, there is a significant 14.9 per-
centage point increase in Medicaid coverage for the newly eligible as well as a 16.2 percentage
point decrease in the probability of being uninsured. The coefficient for private insurance is
positive and insignificant. The crowd-out estimates are also computed. The OLS estimates
produce crowd-out effects that are in the 61.4%-109.81% range. The IV estimates indicate
no crowd-out.
A useful summary of the efficacy of these policies is a measure of what percentage of
the changes in Medicaid coverage is due to changes in Medicaid eligibility. This can be
computed as (β1 ∗∆ELIGk)/∆Mk, where k represents the full sample, foreign born citizens,
or permanent residents.β1 represents the coefficient of eligibility in the regressions, ∆ELIG
is the change in eligibility and ∆M is the change in actual Medicaid coverage over the sample
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period. For the full sample, the results from the lower income regression indicate that 60.07%
of the change in Medicaid coverage can be accounted for by changes in eligibility.
Table 10 looks at the use of health care services and measures of health status for the
full sample. The OLS estimates are significant in three of the four cases and generally have
a different sign than would be expected, indicating the bias in these estimates. The IV
estimates have the expected sign, although they are not statistically significant. There is
a 1.3 percentage point increase in the probability of a medical provider visit and an 8.1
percentage point increase in the probability of a hospital stay for those made eligible for
Medicaid. The effect of Medicaid coverage on hospital stays could theoretically by expected
to be positive or negative. Increases in the use of preventive care would tend to reduce the
probability of an overnight hospital stay but Medicaid eligibility could also lead to greater
probability of overnight stay due to greater access to such facilities. In this case the greater
ease of access leads to an increase in hospital stays. In the IV regressions for health status the
coefficients are of the expected sign with an 4.1 percentage point increase in the probability
of reporting good or excellent health and a significant 8.0 percentage point decrease in the
probability of a sick day in the past year. Table 11 presents results for the lower income
group. The OLS estimates generally have opposite signs than would be expected. The IV
results indicate a significant 7.0 percentage point increase in the probability of a hospital
stay for the lower income group. The other coefficients are not significant.
The rest of the discussion in this section provides estimates by immigration status. Tables
7, 8, and 9 show the results for insurance coverage by citizenship status and length of stay in
the U.S. Table 7 presents estimates for citizens. For the sample of all citizens, the IV results
show a 42.9 percentage point increase in medicaid coverage for those made eligible. The
coefficient for uninsured shows a 27.2 percentage point decrease in the proportion uninsured
but this estimate is insignificant as is the coefficient for private insurance. Columns 4-6
show the estimates when the sample is restricted to the lower income group. The eligibility
coefficient shows a significant 31.3 percentage point increase in Medicaid coverage due to
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eligibility and a 20.2 percentage point decrease in the probability of being uninsured. These
results translate to a 8.86% measure of crowd-out for the full sample of all foreign born
citizens and no measured crowd-out when the sample is limited to lower income group. The
computation for the proportion of changes in Medicaid coverage that is due to eligibility
variation shows that 74% of the increase in coverage is due to increases in eligibility for the
lower income sample.
Table 8 presents the results for permanent residents who have been in the U.S. for at least
5 years. The instrumental variable results show no significant effects of eligibility on any
insurance outcomes for the full sample or the lower income sample. The 0.017 coefficient of
eligibility in the lower income sample translates to a 4.96% contribution of eligibility changes
to the change in Medicaid coverage. The lack of a response to changes in Medicaid eligibility
could be due to the “chilling effect”. The “chilling effect” could be described as the lack
of a response of immigrants to policy changes due to the stigma or fear brought about by
welfare reform (Kaushal and Kaestner 2005). For instance, permanent residents entitled to
Medicaid might forego it due to fear of deportation or a blocked path to citizenship.
Table 9 shows the insurance coverage results for permanents residents who have been in
the U.S. for less than 5 years. The instrumental variables results also show no significant
effect of eligibility on insurance coverage. The change in eligibility in this case accounts
for 1.89% of the overall change in Medicaid coverage. The lack of an effect for this group
could be due to the contrasting policies they faced. On one hand, an increase in Medicaid
income eligibility levels would tend to increase enrollment while the institution of the federal
Medicaid five year bar for recent immigrants would reduce enrollment. With these two
policies in place, the insignificant coefficients in Table 9 represent the zero “net” effect of
these policy changes.
The results for health care use and health measures by immigration status are shown
in Tables 12-14. Table 12 shows the results for foreign born citizens. When the sample is
limited to the lower income group the IV estimates show significant 22.5 percentage point
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increase in the probability of a medical provider visit and a 35.2 percentage point decrease
in the probability of reporting a sick day for those made eligible. All other estimates are
insignificant. Table 13 shows results for permanent residents that have been in the US for
at least 5 years. The estimates generally show no effect apart from a significant increase
in hospital stays for the lower income group. The estimates for permanent residents with a
shorter tenure are shown on Table 14. There are also no significant effects on health care use
and health status for this group. In general, for the three groups studied these results show
a larger impact of Medicaid policy changes on foreign born citizens, in terms of the use of
health care and health improvements. Permanent residents experience a smaller impact due
to the ”chilling effect” for longer tenure permanent residents and the presence of opposing
policies in the case of recently arrived permanent residents.
As stated above the instrumental variable estimates for recently arrived permanent resi-
dents represent the ”net” effect of the Medicaid policy changes (increased income eligibility
and five year bar). The difference-in-differences estimates on Tables 15 and 16 show the
effect of the five year bar, with foreign born citizens as the control group. The results on
Table 15 show a 7.4 percentage point decrease in Medicaid coverage for recent permanent
residents compared to foreign born citizens. There is also a rise in private insurance coverage
and the proportion insured but these are not significant. When the sample is limited to lower
income individuals, there is a 12.3 percentage point decrease in Medicaid coverage and a 10.7
percentage point increase in the probability of being uninsured compared to citizens. This
translates to a 46% estimate of crowd out for the full sample but there is no crowd-out when
the sample is limited to lower income individuals, the group most likely to be bound by the
five year bar. Finally, there is no significant difference in the use of health care services and
in measures of health, as observed in Table 16.
In summary, the results indicate an increase in Medicaid enrollment and a decrease
in the proportion of the immigrant population that is uninsured, with little evidence of
private insurance crowd-out. The estimated measures of crowd-out for the ordinary least
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squares model are much larger but the model is likely biased as discussed. The results for
health care use and measures of health show a significant increase in the utilization of health
services and some evidence of an improvement in health status , particularly in the case
of low income citizens. When the analysis is focused on the five year bar and its effect on
recently arrived permanent residents, the estimates show a significant decrease in Medicaid
coverage accompanied by a rise in the proportion uninsured. There is no effect on health
care utilization and health status.
Conclusion
Since the welfare reform of 1996, there has been a general expansion in the adult popula-
tion that is eligible for Medicaid. Over the same period, there have been policies put in place
that limit the eligibility of immigrants, particularly recently emigrated permanent residents.
There were efforts by some states to cover these immigrant groups that were not eligible for
coverage under federal guidelines. This study aims to examine the effect of these policies- a
general expansion which would tend to increase eligibility and policies which would reduce
eligibility - on the insurance coverage of the immigrant population in the United States.
The results of this paper indicate that there was an increase in immigrant coverage under
medicaid as well as a rise in the total proportion of the immigrant population that is insured.
The measured crowd-out effects are minimal for this group.
The analysis also shows that these changes in medicaid eligibility policy led to a significant
increase in the use of health care services while there is evidence of an improvement in health.
This study is a useful addition to the literature on SCHIP/Medicaid expansions which has
looked at the effect on expansions on various populations such as children and parents. In
particular this is a contribution to studies of the immigrant response to expansion. The
study period (1996-2004) does not cover recent changes in Medicaid and insurance coverage
overall due to the Affordable Care Act but it could be informative on the effects of these new
policies. In particular, the changes in the use of healthcare services and measures of health
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status for newly insured immigrants, could be informed by these prior policy response.
A limitation of this study is that it only considers changes in Medicaid income eligibility
and the effects of the five year bar. There were other modifications in parental eligibility such
as changes to asset tests, to transitional medical assistance programs as well as strategies by
states to facilitate enrollment and renewal procedures (Busch and Duchovny 2005). These
modifications occurred at the same time as the increases in Medicaid eligibility so it is
possible that some of the observed effects attributed to income eligibility expansions may be
due to other Medicaid changes.
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Table 1: Summary of Eligibility Expansions by State, 1996 and 2004
1996 2004
State % of FPL Recent Immigrants % of FPL Recent Immigrants
Eliigible Eligible
Arizona 52 Yes 200 No
California 76 Yes 107 Yes
Connecticut 76 Yes 107 Yes
Florida 34 Yes 62 No
Georgia 45 Yes 58 No
Illinois 52 Yes 83 No
Maryland 46 Yes 40 No
Massachusetts 90 Yes 133 No
Michigan 48 Yes 59 No
New Jersey 47 Yes 200 Yes
New York 59 Yes 150 Yes
North Carolina 56 Yes 57 No
Pennsylvania 65 Yes 200 Yes
Texas 32 Yes 33 No
Virginia 33 Yes 36 No
Washington 62 Yes 200 No
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Table 2: Dependent Variables and Definitions
Variable Definition
Very Good Health or Better Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent reports their
health as very good or excellent
Any Sick Day Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent has had at
least one day when illness or injury kept them in bed for at least
half a day
Medical Provider Visit Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent has visited
a medical provider in the last year
Hospital Stay Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent has had an
overnight hospital stay in the last year
Medicaid Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent is covered
by medicaid
Private Insurance Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent is covered
by private insurance
Insurance Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent is covered
by any kind of insurance
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Lower Income Full Sample
Medicaid 0.20 0.11
(0.40) ((0.31)
Private Insurance 0.36 0.60
(0.48) (0.49)
Uninsured 0.45 0.30
(0.50) (0.46)
Very Good Health or Better 0.55 0.63
(0.50) (0.48)
Any Sick Day 0.32 0.33
(0.47) (0.47)
Medical Provider Visit 0.57 0.65
(0.50) (0.48)
Hospital Stay 0.09 0.07
(0.28) (0.26)
Employed 0.65 0.75
Married 0.76 0.82
Male 0.45 0.47
Age 37.02 37.89
(9.49) (9.09)
Black 0.08 0.08
Hispanic 0.63 0.46
Monthly Household Income 1860.49 4402.07
(1455.55) (4462.37)
Length of Stay in U.S. 13.11 14.52
(8.82) (9.69)
High School Dropout 0.48 0.31
High School Graduate 0.26 0.23
Some College 0.17 0.21
College Graduate 0.06 0.14
More than College 0.03 0.10
Observations 2918 5744
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Immigration Status
Permanent Residents Citizens
Variable Low Income Full Sample Low Income Full Sample
Medicaid 0.20 0.13 0.19 0.08
(0.40) (0.34) (0.40) (0.27)
Private Insurance 0.30 0.47 0.41 0.75
(0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.43)
Uninsured 0.50 0.38 0.35 0.18
(0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.38)
Very Good Health or Better 0.55 0.61 0.53 0.64
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48)
Any Sick Day 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.37
(0.46) (0.46) (0.48) (0.48)
Medical Provider Visit 0.53 0.59 0.65 0.72
(0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.45)
Hospital Stay 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06
(0.30) (0.28) (0.26) (0.24)
Employed 0.64 0.70 0.68 0.81
Married 0.76 0.81 0.77 0.84
Male 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.49
Age 35.83 36.23 39.51 40.05
(9.43) (9.12) (8.90) (8.60)
Black 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10
Hispanic 0.72 0.58 0.43 0.30
Household Income 1839.06 3681.60 1905.44 5342.26
(1430.32) (3987.25) (1506.88) (5253.22)
Length of Stay in US 11.12 10.91 17.29 19.23
(8.10) (8.13) (8.80) (9.54)
High School Dropout 0.55 0.42 0.32 0.18
High School Graduate 0.25 0.24 0.28 0.22
Some College 0.14 0.17 0.25 0.27
College Graduate 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.20
More than College 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.13
Observations 1976 3252 942 2492
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Table 5: Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health Insurance Coverage
Ordinary Least Squares
Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured
Eligible for Medicaid 0.265*** -0.291*** 0.038*
(0.029) (0.032) (0.022)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.111 0.600 0.295
N 5744
Estimated Degree of Crowd Out 109.81%
Two Stage Least Squares
Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured
Eligible for Medicaid 0.207** 0.015 -0.195
(0.077) (0.105) (0.125)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.111 0.600 0.295
N 5744
First Stage F Statistic 64.53
Estimated Degree of Crowd Out 0%
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. Model includes the following ad-
ditional variables: age, age squared, state unemployment rate, and its lag, household income,
length of stay in the U.S., dummy variables for education level, marital status, employment
status, immigration status, and indicator variables for sex, race, presence in the U.S. for less
than five years and hispanic. State and year fixed effects also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 6: Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health Insurance Outcomes, Lower Income Group
Ordinary Least Squares
Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured
Eligible for Medicaid 0.171*** -0.105*** -0.052**
(0.028) (0.035) (0.021)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.197 0.357 0.455
N 2918
Estimated Degree of Crowd Out 61.40%
Two Stage Least Squares
Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured
Eligible for Medicaid 0.149** 0.067 -0.162**
(0.067) (0.045) (0.075)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.197 0.357 0.455
N 2918
First Stage F Statistic 120.32
Estimated Degree of Crowd Out 0%
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. Model includes the following
additional variables: age, age squared, state unemployment rate and its lag, household income,
length of stay in the U.S., dummy variables for education level, marital status, employment
status and indicator variables for sex, immigration status, race, presence in the U.S. for less
than 5 years, and hispanic. State and year fixed effects also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 7: Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health Insurance Outcomes, Citizens
Ordinary Least Squares
Full Sample Lower Income
Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured
Eligible 0.256*** -0.339*** 0.114*** 0.162*** -0.080 -0.040
(0.034) (0.038) (0.026) (0.034) (0.051) (0.049)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.081 0.748 0.180 0.187 0.476 0.356
N 2492 942
Estimated Crowd Out 132.42% 49.38%
Two Stage Least Squares
Full Sample Lower Income
Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured
Eligible 0.429** -0.038 -0.272 0.313*** 0.029 -0.202
(0.146) (0.216) (0.227) (0.089) (0.160) (0.172)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.081 0.748 0.180 0.187 0.476 0.356
N 2492 942
First Stage F Statistic 29.04 45.71
Estimated Crowd Out 8.86% 0%
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the
following additional variables: age, age squared, state unemployment rate and its lag,
household income, length of stay in the U.S., dummy variables for education level, marital
status, employment status and indicator variables for sex, race, presence in the U.S. for
less than 5 years and hispanic. State and year fixed effects also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 8: Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health Insurance Outcomes, Permanent
Residents (≥5 years)
Ordinary Least Squares
Full Sample Lower Income
Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured
Eligible 0.271*** -0.270*** -0.002 0.196*** -0.137*** -0.063**
(0.034) (0.041) (0.028) (0.028) (0.040) (0.024)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.139 0.499 0.365 0.205 0.320 0.479
N 2493 1529
Estimated Crowd Out 99.63% 69.90%
Two Stage Least Squares
Full Sample Lower Income
Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured
Eligible 0.050 0.047 -0.102 0.017 0.150 -0.179
(0.134) (0.111) (0.175) (0.153) (0.118) (0.126)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.139 0.499 0.365 0.205 0.320 0.479
N 2493 1529
First Stage F Statistic 31.45 63.16
Estimated Crowd Out 0% 0%
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the
following additional variables: age, age squared, state unemployment rate and its lag,
household income, length of stay in the U.S., dummy variables for education level, marital
status, employment status and indicator variables for sex, race, presence in the U.S. for
less than 5 years and hispanic. State and year fixed effects
also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 9: Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health Insurance Outcomes, Permanent
Residents (<5 years)
Ordinary Least Squares
Full Sample Lower Income
Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured
Eligible 0.256*** -0.226*** -0.024 0.137*** -0.087 -0.037**
(0.040) (0.065) (0.067) (0.051) (0.100) (0.080)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.119 0.444 0.444 0.190 0.235 0.582
N 759 447
Estimated Crowd Out 99.25% 91.26%
Two Stage Least Squares
Full Sample Lower Income
Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured
Eligible 0.047 0.218 -0.201 0.062 0.028 -0.056
(0.076) (0.181) (0.170) (0.054) (0.129) (0.161)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.119 0.444 0.444 0.190 0.235 0.582
N 759 447
First Stage F Statistic 10.70 20.34
Estimated Crowd Out 0% 0%
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the
following additional variables: age, age squared, state unemployment rate and its lag,
household income, length of stay in the U.S., dummy variables for education level, marital
status, employment status and indicator variables for sex, race, presence in the U.S. for
less than 5 years and hispanic. State and year fixed effects
also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 10: Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health Care Use and Health
Ordinary Least Squares
Medical Provider Hospital Stay Good Health Sick Day
Visit
Eligible for Medicaid -0.015 0.025*** -0.070*** 0.044**
(0.011) (0.006) (0.023) (0.015)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.646 0.073 0.626 0.335
N 5744
Two Stage Least Squares
Medical Provider Hospital Stay Good Health Sick Day
Visit
Eligible for Medicaid 0.013 0.081 0.041 -0.080
(0.064) (0.079) (0.101) (0.108)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.646 0.073 0.626 0.335
N 5744
First Stage F Statistic 64.53
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following additional
variables: age, age squared, state unemployment rate and its lag, household income, length of stay in
the U.S., dummy variables for education level, marital status, employment status, immigration status and
indicator variables for sex, race, presence in the U.S. for less than 5 years and hispanic.State and year fixed
effects also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 11: Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health Care Use and Health, Lower Income
Group
Ordinary Least Squares
Medical Provider Hospital Stay Good Health Sick Day
Visit
Eligible for Medicaid -0.012 0.007 -0.007 0.034*
(0.023) (0.013) (0.032) (0.018)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.571 0.089 0.548 0.320
N 2918
Two Stage Least Squares
Medical Provider Hospital Stay Good Health Sick Day
Visit
Eligible for Medicaid 0.064 0.070** -0.034 0.046
(0.059) (0.032) (0.063) (0.058)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.571 0.089 0.548 0.320
N 2918
First Stage F Statistic 120.32
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following additional
variables: age, age squared, state unemployment rate and its lag, household income, length of stay in
the US, dummy variables for education level, marital status, employment status, immigration status and
indicator variables for sex, race, presence in the US for less than 5 years and hispanic. State and year fixed
effects also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 12: Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health Care Use and Health, Citizens
Ordinary Least Squares
Full Sample Lower Income
Medical Provider Hospital Good Sick Medical Provider Hospital Good Sick
Visit Stay Health Day Visit Stay Health Day
Eligible -0.036* 0.023 -0.046 0.027 -0.021 -0.011 0.022 0.001
(0.020) (0.014) (0.037) (0.019) (0.038) (0.016) (0.060) (0.043)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.717 0.060 0.645 0.370 0.644 0.068 0.531 0.351
N 2492 942
Two Stage Least Squares
Full Sample Lower Income
Medical Provider Hospital Good Sick Medical Provider Hospital Good Sick
Visit Stay Health Day Visit Stay Health Day
Eligible -0.020 0.064 0.076 -0.340 0.225* -0.011 -0.008 -0.352**
(0.192) (0.112) (0.130) (0.206) (0.124) (0.067) (0.183) (0.138)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.192 0.112 0.130 0.206 0.644 0.068 0.531 0.351
N 2492 942
First Stage F Statistic 29.04 45.71
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following additional variables: age, age squared, state unemployment
rate and its lag, household income, length of stay in the U.S., dummy variables for education level, marital status, employment status and indicator
variables for sex, race and hispanic. State and year fixed effects also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 13: Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health Care Use and Health, Permanent Residents (≥5 years)
Ordinary Least Squares
Full Sample Lower Income
Medical Provider Hospital Good Sick Medical Provider Hospital Good Sick
Visit Stay Health Day Visit Stay Health Day
Eligible 0.005 0.039*** -0.071** 0.059*** -0.008 0.016 -0.009 0.047
(0.029) (0.006) (0.027) (0.019) (0.035) (0.015) (0.052) (0.027)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.600 0.075 0.602 0.306 0.544 0.092 0.544 0.301
N 2493 1529
Two Stage Least Squares
Full Sample Lower Income
Medical Provider Hospital Good Sick Medical Provider Hospital Good Sick
Visit Stay Health Day Visit Stay Health Day
Eligible 0.035 0.088 0.135 -0.003 0.124 0.148*** 0.019 0.165
(0.147) (0.097) (0.153) (0.194) (0.122) (0.042) (0.144) (0.124)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.600 0.075 0.602 0.306 0.544 0.092 0.544 0.301
N 2493 1529
First Stage F Statistic 31.45 63.16
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following additional variables: age, age squared, state unemployment
rate and its lag, household income, length of stay in the U.S., dummy variables for education level, marital status, employment status and indicator
variables for sex, race, and hispanic. State and year fixed effects also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 14: Effect of Medicaid Eligibility on Health Care Use and Health, Permanent Residents (<5 years)
Ordinary Least Squares
Full Sample Lower Income
Medical Provider Hospital Good Sick Medical Provider Hospital Good Sick
Visit Stay Health Day Visit Stay Health Day
Eligible -0.024 -0.019 -0.108* 0.030 0.020 0.017 -0.072 0.045
(0.044) (0.020) (0.055) (0.037) (0.079) (0.040) (0.059) (0.046)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.565 0.109 0.642 0.318 0.508 0.116 0.599 0.320
N 759 447
Two Stage Least Squares
Full Sample Lower Income
Medical Provider Hospital Good Sick Medical Provider Hospital Good Sick
Visit Stay Health Day Visit Stay Health Day
Eligible 0.142 0.142 0.044 0.153 0.110 0.115 -0.059 0.271
(0.228) (0.090) (0.216) (0.169) (0.192) (0.085) (0.162) (0.157)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.565 0.109 0.642 0.318 0.508 0.116 0.599 0.320
N 759 447
First Stage F Statistic 10.70 20.34
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following additional variables: age, age squared, state unemployment
rate and its lag, household income, length of stay in the U.S., dummy variables for education level, marital status, employment status and indicator
variables for sex, race, and hispanic.State and year fixed effects also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
35
Table 15: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of the Effect of Medicaid Five Year Bar on
Health Insurance Coverage for Permanent Residents (<5 years) - Comparison Group
Naturalized Citizens
Full Sample
Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured
Permanent Resident 0.016 -0.160*** 0.136***
(0.015) (0.023) (0.032)
Post-Reform*Permanent Resident -0.074*** 0.034 0.042
(0.025) (0.040) (0.044)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.091 0.679 0.239
N 3155
Estimated Crowd-Out 45.95%
Lower Income
Medicaid Private Insurance Uninsured
Permanent Resident 0.022 -0.128*** 0.093*
(0.036) (0.035) (0.048)
Post-Reform*Permanent Resident -0.123*** 0.000 0.107*
(0.041) (0.036) (0.059)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.191 0.401 0.423
N 1338
Estimated Crowd-Out 0%
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. Model include the following ad-
ditional variables: age, age squared, state unemployment rate and its lag, household income,
length of stay in the U.S., dummy variables for education level, marital status, employment
status and indicator variables for sex, race and hispanic. State and year fixed effects also
included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 16: Difference-in-Differences Estimate of the Effect of Medicaid Five Year Bar on
Health Care and Health for Permanent Residents (<5 years) - Comparison Group
Naturalized Citizens
Full Sample
Medical Provider Hospital Stay Good Health Sick Day
Visit
Permanent Resident -0.054* 0.055* -0.018 0.017
(0.025) (0.020) (0.034) (0.055)
Post-Reform*Permanent Resident -0.014 -0.034 0.060 -0.006
(0.030) (0.013) (0.036) (0.043)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.684 0.071 0.644 0.361
N 3155
Lower Income
Medical Provider Hospital Stay Good Health Sick Day
Visit
Permanent Resident -0.008 0.049 0.026 0.019
(0.041) (0.032) (0.061) (0.072)
Post-Reform*Permanent Resident -0.045 -0.015 0.026 0.030
(0.061) (0.013) (0.051) (0.066)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.603 0.083 0.554 0.344
N 1338
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the
following additional variables: age, age squared, state unemployment rate and its lag,
household income, length of stay in the U.S., dummy variables for education level, marital
status, employment status, immigration status and indicator variables for sex, race,
and hispanic. State and year fixed effects also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Healthy Start Program on Infant
Mortality Outcomes
Introduction
The infant mortality rate, defined as the number of deaths of infants under one year old
per 1000 births, has been falling over the time in the United States. This decline in infant
mortality rates has been due to a number of factors such as the drop in mortality from
birth defects, low birth weight, sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) and injuries (Singh
and Van Dyck, 2010). However the United States has fallen behind in terms of its infant
mortality ranking compared with other nations. It has gone from a rank of twelfth place
(26 per thousand live births) in 1960 to twenty ninth (6.8 per thousand live births) place in
2004 (Health, United States 2007). This demonstrates that the progress made in the United
States on infant mortality has been less than stellar.
One reason for the lagging performance of overall infant mortality measures in the United
States is the rate among non-hispanic blacks. There has been a slower decline over time in the
black infant mortality rate than the white rate. This has led to a huge disparity between the
black infant mortality rate, which was 13.2 in 2007, and the rate for white infants, which was
5.6 in 2007 (Singh and Van Dyck, 2010). This suggests that there is room for improvement
in infant mortality outcomes of the US with respect to other countries. There is also great
room for improvements within the United States with regard to the racial differences in
the infant mortality rate. These improvements could be attained with targeted policies and
government programs.
Programs and policies have been put in place in the United States to improve infant
mortality outcomes such as family planning clinics, community health centers, expansion of
Medicaid programs and expansion of neonatal intensive care facilities. Another relatively
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more recent program is Healthy Start. The aim of the program is specifically to reduce the
rate of infant mortality and improve other newborn outcomes. This is done by establishing
Healthy Start sites in areas with relatively high infant mortality rates.
This paper examines the effectiveness of the Healthy Start program. The aim is to see
if it has had any effect on the infant mortality rate and to quantify the magnitude of this
effect, if any. The infant mortality rate is compared in counties with the program and those
without the program. This analysis uses data mainly from the Area Health and Resource file
and the CDC WONDER database, with additional data gathered from other sources. The
analysis of the dataset capitalizes on variation in program implementation across counties, as
well as differences in the date of program implementation over time. To control for possible
policy endogeneity, each healthy start treatment site is compared with a “synthetic” control
that has similar characteristics prior to treatment.
Previous Literature
Previous empirical literature looked at the effect of various policies on infant mortality
outcomes in the US. Grossman and Jacobowitz (1981) study the role of multiple policies
and programs in the fall of the neonatal infant mortality rate during the 1960s and 1970s.
The authors find that increased use of family planning and abortion services have the largest
impacts on rates. This would suggest that efforts to reduce infant mortality rates should
include multiple varied approaches such as changes in Medicaid policy and family planning
services. A similar paper by Corman and Grossman (1985) looks at the effect of these policies
on the Neonatal Infant Mortality rate (infant mortality within the first 27 days of life). Both
papers find similar results. In particular, they find very strong effects of these variables
(Medicaid eligibility, presence of family planning clinics and other government programs,
availability of abortion services) on the black population. In both analyses a cross-section
regression is run for a particular period and the coefficients obtained are then applied to
other periods.
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The viability of these policies in terms of their costs is also an important consideration.
Joyce et al. (1988) examine the cost effectiveness of various policies in reducing neonatal
infant mortality such as prenatal care and neonatal intensive care. They find that early
initiation of prenatal care practices is the most cost effective method. Currie et al (1994)
focus on Medicaid fee policy in particular. The Medicaid fee is the amount paid by Medicaid
programs for health services used by its recipients. They find that raising the ratio of
Medicaid fees to private sector fees leads to a significant drop in infant mortality rate. The
study also compares the cost effectiveness of changing Medicaid policy in different ways i.e.
increasing the fee ratio or expanding eligibility for pregnant women. It finds that raising the
fee ratio is at least as cost effective as expanding eligibility.
The efficacy of the Healthy Start program has also been studied. Moreno et al (2000)
look at the impact of this program on Infant Mortality and Birth Outcomes in the 15 original
target areas from initiation up till 1996. Two comparison areas are selected for each of these
Healthy Start sites based on racial and ethnic composition, the level of infant mortality
prior to the Healthy Start program and the trend for infant mortality. They study each
of these sites individually and compare them with the comparison sites. The paper finds
improvements in variables such as prenatal care utilization, low birth weight rates and infant
mortality rates in some of the sites. However, few of these improvements at the sites are
significant. In particular they find statistically significant decreases in infant mortality rates
for two sites out of fifteen. It is a possibility that the chosen comparison sites are not the
appropriate counterfactuals for these sites. The ideal way to examine the Healthy Start
program would be random assignment and then a comparison of the treatment and control
groups. However, the comparison sites were chosen after the program was established. The
authors make efforts to select comparison sites that are as similar to the Healthy Start sites
but there is still the possibility that they are not the proper controls. This article differs from
the Moreno et al study in that it looks at a different time period (1996-2008) and it examines
Healthy Start programs that were established in this time frame, not the 15 original target
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areas.
Healthy Start Program
The Healthy Start program was instituted in 1991 by the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA) with a mandate to reduce infant mortality rates and improve perina-
tal outcomes. Fifteen program sites were initially established in places with infant mortality
rates considerably higher than the national average (1.5 to 2.5 times). These Healthy Start
programs are usually coordinated at the county level. The HRSA works by providing grants
to local organizations in these areas to begin and coordinate the Healthy Start programs.
The organizations could be government entities such as county health departments or it
could be non-governmental organizations receiving these grants. The program has a base
office from which it operates and carries out its work within communities in its target area.
Over time the Healthy Start program has been expanded and new sites have been opened.
There are currently over 100 Healthy Start programs in 38 states, the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico. The intervention services carried out by Healthy Start include outreach
and case management, providing a network of support services and providing enhancements
to available clinical services (Devaney et al 2000). Outreach and case management involves
initial contact with service recipients, enrolling them in the program, assessing their needs,
making future plans and referrals and ongoing contact and tracking of service recipients.
The support services provided include transportation assistance, substance abuse counsel-
ing, health education and child care. The enhancements to clinical services include clinic
services to infants and pregnant women. This is usually done by providing support to the
existing delivery system for prenatal, postpartum and infant care (Devaney et al 2000). This
support was usually in the form of extra funding to these delivery systems.
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Data
Most of the data used in this analysis was obtained from the Area Health Resource File
(AHRF) dataset and the CDC WONDER Database. The AHRF consists of over 6000 vari-
ables observed at the county level. It contains data which was collected from the American
Medical Association, American Hospital Association, US Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor
Statistics and National Center for Health Statistics. It also contains information on socioe-
conomic and health characteristics, the number of health facilities and health professionals
etc. Data from the AHRF are obtained, at the county level, over a fifteen year period (1996-
2008). The county level data on doctors and hospitals are used to calculate the number of
doctors and of hospitals per capita. The CDC WONDER database contains information on
the dependent variable, annual infant mortality rates for counties with a population of at
least 250,000 and at least 10 deaths. Unfortunately data for counties with smaller popula-
tions and number of deaths are not available in this data. This implies that the Healthy
Start programs examined, as well as their potential controls, are in counties with larger
populations. Data for total infant mortality rates as well as black infant mortality rates in
particular are obtained from the CDC WONDER database. The infant mortality data is
subject to yearly fluctuations. In order to make the general trend over time more observable,
this dependent variable is converted from a yearly measure to a three year moving average
for the analysis.
Additional socioeconomic data are gathered from other sources. Data for the total pop-
ulation, the number of African Americans, number of Hispanics and square miles by county
over the time period being examined (1996-2008) are obtained. These variables were gath-
ered from the Census Bureau. Together these are used to calculate the proportion of the
county population that is African American and the proportion that is Hispanic. The county
square miles data are used to calculate the population per square mile. Data on poverty
rates at the county level were obtained from the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates
(SAIPE) provided by the US Census. This dataset contains estimates of the proportion of
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the population in poverty for most years. However it does not contain county level poverty
estimates for every year being used in this analysis. Estimates for 1996 were obtained using
interpolation.
Educational attainment estimates are also included in the analysis. This consists of in-
formation about the proportion of county population that did not complete high school.
Unfortunately, these data are not readily available for the whole time period being exam-
ined. It was released only as part of the decennial census (1990 and 2000). In its place,
yearly estimates provided by Eckhardt (2010) are used for the years 1996 to 2004. Eckhardt
uses spatial methods to obtain the county estimates for each period. The data are obtained
by a two-step interpolation process. In the first step a simple linear interpolation is used
to obtain annual estimates. In the second step a nonlinear method is used to match the
estimates obtained to the total county population and the state level shares of each educa-
tional category. Results are only provided for counties in the lower 48 states of the United
States, excluding Hawaii and Alaska. Thus, the analysis excludes these two states. It would
of course be preferable to have the actual annual numbers but these estimates provide a
reasonable approximation. For the years 2005-2008 the educational attainment data was
obtained from the American Community survey (ACS). These two datasets are combined to
create the educational attainment estimates.
Table 1 below shows the summary statistics for the variables at the county level. The
average infant mortality rate over the period examined for the counties included is 6.94
deaths per thousand births. However infant mortality was on a downward trend in this
period. It ranges from a value of 7.416 in 1995 to 6.432 in 2009 for this sample. Similarly the
average black infant mortality rate was on a downward trend. It ranges from 14.637 in 1995
to 12.329 in 2009, with an average of 13.698. This downward trend is observable in Figure 1.
The variable Healthy Start measures the proportion of counties that had the program over
the time period examined. It takes on a value of one in county i in year t if the program
was in place at that time and a value of zero otherwise. Healthy Start programs vary across
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counties in their date of implementation so this value is going to vary over time. For the
period studied the Healthy Start program was in place in about 25% of counties for the Total
infant mortality data and 42% for the black infant mortality dataset. As discussed earlier
the annual infant mortality data is available only for counties with populations of at least
250,000 and 10 infant mortality deaths. For total infant mortality data could be obtained
for 193 counties and data could be obtained for 104 in the case of black infant mortality
rates.
Healthy Start sites were chosen on the basis that they had higher infant mortality rates
than average. To ensure this is the case the total infant mortality rates of Healthy Start
sites is compared to other counties without the program. The results are shown in Table
2. The average infant mortality rate of Healthy Start counties in the year the program is
established is greater than the average for counties without the program. The average for
Healthy Start sites is also greater in the two years prior to the program being established.
The table also shows the minimum and maximum infant mortality rates for Healthy Start
and non Healthy Start areas by year. The maximum infant mortality rate is greater for non
Healthy Start counties and the minimum infant mortality rate is also lower for non Healthy
Start counties. The higher average infant mortality rate in Healthy Start counties provides
evidence that these programs were indeed established in areas with higher rates.
Emprical Specifications
In order to estimate the effect of the Healthy Start Program the treatment sites – counties
that have established Health Start programs – are compared with counties that do not have
the program using the synthetic control method. The synthetic control (SC) method was
first developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and extended by Abadie et al (2010). It
involves creating a synthetic control group for each treatment. Each synthetic control is a
weighted combination of the potential control sites constructed such that it approximates
the characteristics of the treated unit prior to treatment actually occurring. In this case the
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potential controls would be the counties with no healthy start programs. Thus, the synthetic
control is meant to serve as a counterfactual for the treated unit in the absence of treatment.
Formally, this model can be represented as a case where we observe a panel of IC + 1
counties over T periods. At time T0 < T , county i receives the Healthy Start treatment
while the rest of the counties do not. The treatment effect for county i can be defined as:
τit = Yit(1)− Yit(0) = Yit − Yit(0)
where Yit(1) and Yit(0) refer to the potential outcome for county i with and without treat-
ment. In this case the estimate of interest is τiT0+1, τiT0+2,..., τiT . However, we cannot observe
τit directly since the counterfactual Yit(0) is not observable. Abadie et al (2010) devise a
method for identifying the treatment effect. Let
Yjt(0) = δt + pijt
Yjt(1) = τjt + δt + pijt
with j=1,......,Ic +1. In this case τjt is different from zero only for the treatment site (j=i)
and t > T0. The outcome in the case also depends on pijt and a common factor δt . pijt can
be expressed as:
pijt = Xjtθt + λtµj + jt
where Xj consists of the covariates not affected by the intervention that can be time invariant
or time varying. θt is a vector of time specific parameters. λt is an unknown common factor
and µj is a county specific unobservable. jt is the residual term. In this model Xj consist
of the infant mortality rates before treatment, the proportion of the population that did
not complete high school, proportion of the population that is hispanic, proportion of the
population that is black, population per square mile and number of doctors and hospitals
per capita. These variables apart from the lagged dependent variables are averaged over the
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entire pretreatment period.
Let the weights that will be used to obtain the synthetic control unit be defined as W=
(w1, w2,....wIc). This is a vector of weights such that
∑
wj = 1 and wj ≥ 0. There are many
possible choices of W and each would correspond to a different choice of a synthetic control
for county i. If Y¯ kj =
∑T0
s=1 ksYjs, a linear combination of the pretreatment outcome, then
Abadie et al (2010) show that if we choose the particular vector of weights W* such that
Ic∑
j=1
w∗j Y¯
k
j = Y¯
k
i and
Ic∑
j=1
w∗jXj = Xi
then τˆit = Yit −
Ic∑
j=1
w∗jYjt
In summary if we choose the weights (W*) such that the pretreatment dependent variable
and average of the covariates of the constructed control are very similar to that of the
treatment county on average, then the effect of the treatment can be estimated. The weights
are chosen such that the distance between the vector of pretreatment characteristics of the
treatment and synthetic control is minimized. This approach allows for transparency as the
weights W* of counties contributing to the counterfactual control can be clearly identified
and can be properly restricted to just counties with no Healthy Start program.
A limitation of the synthetic control techniques is that it does not allow for a test of the
significance of the results, as can be done with other empirical techniques. However, placebo
experiments can be performed as suggested by Abadie et al (2010). Under this approach,
the synthetic control algorithm is applied to every county in the pool of potential controls.
The difference treatment effect observed for the placebos is then plotted and compared with
the treatment effect for the actual treatment unit (depicted with a darker line in the placebo
test figures). This is meant to determine if the estimated effects for the treated county are
large compared to the effects for counties chosen at random where there was no Healthy
Start treatment.
Another limitation is that the method can be used only in cases where there is one
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treatment site. For the Healthy Start program there are multiple treatment counties that
received the treatment at different periods. Due to these limitations, the analysis for each
Healthy Start site is done separately. This is appropriate in this case as each Healthy Start
program is essentially independently operated, although all programs have the same source
of funding. Prior work that has taken this approach of multiple treatments includes Billmeier
and Nannicini (2013).
The set of possible controls consists of counties that never had a program in place over
the period studied (1996-2008). The results are shown graphically as well as in table form.
Results
The synthetic control experiments by year of program implementation are presented and
discussed in this section. The results are presented numerically in Tables 3 through 14
and graphically (Figures 2 through 19). The tables show the comparison by explanatory
variables between each treatment county and its synthetic control as well as dependent
variable estimates for the treatment and control for selected post-treatment periods. The
figures show the time series of the outcome variable, total infant mortality rate or black
infant mortality rate, for the treated unit (solid line) and the control unit (dashed line) prior
to the treatment period and after treatment has commenced. In the pretreatment period,
the comparison between the two lines is a measure of the quality of the fit between the
treatment and control obtained by the synthetic control algorithm. In the post-treatment
periods, the comparison between the two lines is a measure of the treatment effects by year.
The placebo tests are shown in figures 20 and 21. This analysis is performed for counties
where the initial evidence suggests that the Healthy Start program has been effective in
reducing infant mortality. The placebo tests in some cases confirm the earlier evidence
while in other cases it suggests that the observed effect could be coincidental. In the figures
the darker line represents the difference between the treatment and synthetic controls for
the actual Healthy Start counties while the gray lines represent the difference between the
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treatment and controls for the placebos.
The results for the Healthy Start programs established in 1998 are shown on Table 3 (total
infant mortality) and Table 9 (black infant mortality), while the results are shown graphically
in Figures 2-4 (total infant mortality) and Figures 11-13 (black infant mortality). The results
for total infant mortality rate suggest that 6 of the 11 counties examined (Fulton, Jefferson,
Los Angeles, Mobile, Polk and St. Clair) saw reductions in the total infant mortality rate
in the post-treatment period. Fulton County has a rate that is 12 percent lower than the
counterfactual five years after treatment begins and 10 percent lower after 10 years. Jefferson
County has an infant mortality rate that is 7 percent lower in year five and 17 percent lower
ten years post treatment than the control county. The rate in Mobile County is 19 percent
below the counterfactual in year five and 26 percent below in year 10. In the case of St. Clair
County, it appears that the program has no impact on outcomes initially but its effectiveness
increases over time. By year five after treatment, the mortality rate is 17 percent lower than
the control and it is 20 percent lower by year ten. The results for these four counties are also
robust to the placebo tests, as their treatment effects are lower than the majority of the fake
treatments shown in figure 20. On the other hand the synthetic control estimates for Los
Angeles County and Polk County also show a decrease in infant mortality compared to their
controls (12 percent for Los Angeles County, 5-10 percent for Polk county) but these results
are not robust to the placebo tests in figure 20, as a large number of the fake experiments
are below these two treatment counties. One possible mitigating factor in the case of Polk
Co. is the lack of a good fit with the obtained control in the pretreatment period.
The 1998 Healthy Start program results for the black infant mortality rate are broadly
similar to the overall results. Six of the ten counties examined (Fulton, Harris, Jefferson,
Los Angeles, St. Clair and Mobile) saw a decrease in the black infant mortality rate post
treatment compared to the counterfactual. Four of these six counties are considerably lower
than the majority of the placebo treatments. Fulton County has a black infant mortality
rate that is 9 percent lower in year five after treatment and 7 percent lower ten years after
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treatment. Jefferson County is 20 percent lower in year five and 25 percent lower in year ten
than its counterfactual. The corresponding numbers for Mobile County show a 22 percent
difference in year five and a 16 percent difference in year ten. St. Clair County shows a rate
that is 40 percent below the counterfactual in year five, although this relative difference falls
to 17 percent by year ten. The placebo tests for these four counties also show that their
treatment effects are larger in most cases than the placebo treatments, although the result
for Jefferson County is not as strong as the others. As stated earlier, two of the treated
counties (Harris and Los Angeles) also shows results that suggest a reduction in black infant
mortality rates compared to the counterfactual. However, these estimates are not robust to
the placebo tests.
The results for Health Start programs established in 1999 are shown in Table 4 and
Figures 5-6. The results show that 1 of 8 programs established (Alameda County) had a
lower infant mortality trajectory in the treatment period, with a rate that is 10 percent
lower after five years and 12 percent lower after nine years. However, further tests indicate
that this result is not robust as a sizable proportion of the placebo treatments in Figure 20
show a larger effect. Similar results hold when the estimates for black infant mortality are
examined. Alameda County has a lower trajectory than its control in the treatment period,
17 percent lower after five years and 15 percent lower after ten years, but it is also cannot be
distinguished from the placebo treatments in Figure 21. The results for programs established
in the year 2000 (Tables 5 and 11, Figures 7 and 16) do not indicate that any of them have
been able to reduce infant mortality compared to their synthetic controls.
Table 6 and Figure 8 display the results for the Healthy Start programs established in
2001. Kings County has a lower infant mortality trend than its control in the treatment
period (9 percent below in year five and 21 percent below in year seven). It could also be
argued that Genesee Co eventually has a lower trend than its control in the latter part of
the treatment time frame (9 percent below in year five and 12 percent below in year seven).
However both of these counties do not pass their placebo tests as shown in figure 20. The
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results for the black rate (Table 12 and Figure 17) are slightly different from the overall
picture. Kings County still shows a lower trend than its control (11 percent lower in year
five and 9 percent lower in year seven) but Genessee does not show a lower rate than its
control, although the control site is not a very good pretreatment match in this case. Another
difference from the overall results is the estimates for Maricopa County. The early results
after treatment begins indicate a fall in the mortality rate compared to the control but it
eventually rises and coincides with the control rate. This equates to a black infant mortality
rate that is 13 percent lower in year five. This could indicate that the program was initially
effective in Maricopa but over time this effect dissipated. The placebo test results for Kings
County are similar to the overall results, with a trend that is not very different from the
placebos. On the other hand, the placebo test for Maricopa County indicates a difference
from the placebos in the initial period after treatment although the difference disappears by
the end of the period studied.
The infant mortality rates for the Healthy Start programs established in 2002 are shown
on Table 13 and Figure 9. Neither of the counties examined show a trend below their
controls. When the results are limited to black infant mortality (Table 13 and Figure 18),
Bexar County has a trend which is lower in comparison to its control for most of the treatment
period. It is 10 percent lower in year 3 after treatment and 17 percent lower in year six.
However, the result for the placebo tests in figure 17 indicate that the estimates are not very
different from the placebo experiments.
The last set of results to be examined pertain to Healthy Start programs that were
established in 2004 and 2006 (Table 8 and Figure 10). The results for Kent Co., (established
in 2004) indicate a 17 percent difference between the treatment site and the control two
years after treatment and a 15 percent difference four years after treatment. The placebo
test (Figure 20) shows that treatment effect for Kent County is below most of the treatment
effects for the “placebo” counties, providing further evidence in support of a real treatment
effect. The results for Monroe County (program established in 2006) do not show a reduction
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in infant mortality rates compared to the control. A similar pattern emerges when the black
infant mortality rate is examined. A reduction in the rate is observed for Kent County
compared to its control (13 percent lower at year two and 0.4 percent lower at year four).
The placebo test also shows that this effect is relatively large compared to the “placebo”
treatments.
In summary the results indicate that the Healthy Start program had an effect in some
treatment sites and was not as effective in others. For the overall measure of infant mortality,
5 of the 30 Healthy Start programs examined show an effect while 6 of the 27 programs show
a reduction in black infant mortality rates. These results are plausible as each Healthy Start
program is independently run and managed with no national authority, even though all are
funded by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). Thus, each program
can be thought of as a separate treatment. In this case it would be expected that there
would be some variation in the efficiency of the treatments.
Discussion
As observed in the previous section, there is considerable heterogeneity in the results
across different programs. This variation in treatment effects warrants further investigation.
One possible explanation is regional differences. The programs that were effective over the
period of study are located in the Southern and Mid-Western regions of the United States.
It is possible that these areas are ideal for the initiatives and methods used by the programs.
Further examination of the descriptive statistics by program effectiveness (shown in Ta-
bles 15 and 16) yields another possible explanation. Group 1 consists of Healthy Start
Counties that saw a reduction in infant mortality rates while group 2 consists of programs
where there was no drop in mortality rates in their areas of operation. A test of the mean
differences reveals that the effective healthy start programs are located in areas with a sig-
nificantly lower hispanic population and a significantly larger black population. As stated
earlier the black mortality rate is significantly greater than the overall rate, so it is not
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surprising that the effective programs are located in areas with larger black proportions.
Another notable difference between the two groups is in their population density. The effec-
tive programs are located in areas with relatively low population densities compared to those
that were not effective. Prior literature has shown that physical health indicators are higher
in areas of greater population density (Fassio et al 2013) possibly due to greater access to
health services. In particular Hanlon et al (2012) find that higher measures of population
density are associated with better indicators of maternal health care coverage.
An integral component of the Healthy Start programs is outreach and case management
for their potential clients. Part of case management involves connecting these pregnant
women with the relevant health care services and ensuring continued use. This initiative is
more likely to have a substantive effect in lower population density areas, where access to
health care services is more likely to be an impediment. This could explain why the program
has been effective in lower density areas. It improves the connection between pregnant clients
and the required health services, particularly in areas where health care access might be a
challenge.
Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of Healthy Start programs on infant mortality rates. The
program, which was established in 1991 and has expanded around the U.S since then, is
shown to have led to a drop in infant mortality rates in some of the regions where the
program was operational.
These results should be interpreted with caution due to the limited nature of the data
used. This study uses data for 193 counties in the case of the total infant mortality rate and
104 counties in the case of the black infant mortality rate. These datasets do not contain
information for every county that had a Healthy Start program. Thus this study does not
account for the effect of every Healthy Start program site over the period studied. It also
looks only at programs that were established between 1998 and 2006.
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It would have been ideal for the study of this program if the data for all counties with the
program could be obtained and the Healthy Start treatment had been randomly assigned.
Given the constraints faced, the appropriate methods have been used to address the question
at hand.
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Figure 1: Change in Infant Mortality Rates over Time 
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Figure 2: Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 1998 Treatment 
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Figure 3: Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 1998 Treatment 
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Figure 4: Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 1998 Treatment 
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Figure 5: Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 1999 Treatment 
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Figure 6: Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 1999 Treatment 
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Figure 7: Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 2000 Treatment 
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Figure 8: Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 2001 Treatment 
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Figure 9: Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 2002 Treatment 
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Figure 10: Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 2004/2006 Treatment 
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Figure 11: Black Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 1998 Treatment 
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Figure 12: Black Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 1998 Treatment 
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Figure 13: Black Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 1998 Treatment 
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Figure 14: Black Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 1999 Treatment 
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Figure 15: Black Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 1999 Treatment 
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Figure 16: Black Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 2000 Treatment 
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Figure 17: Black Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 2001 Treatment 
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Figure 18: Black Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 2002 Treatment 
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Figure 19: Black Infant Mortality Trends, Treated County vs. Synthetic County – 2004/2006 Treatment 
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Figure 20a: Placebo Experiments – Total Infant Mortality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
G
ap
 in
 In
fa
nt
 M
or
ta
lit
y 
R
at
es
1996 2001 2006
Year
Alameda Co., CA 1999
-4
-2
0
2
4
G
ap
 in
 In
fa
nt
 M
or
ta
lit
y 
R
at
es
1996 2001 2006
Year
Fulton Co., GA 1998
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
G
ap
 in
 In
fa
nt
 M
or
ta
lit
y 
R
at
es
1996 2001 2006
Year
Genessee Co., MI 2001
-4
-2
0
2
4
G
ap
 in
 In
fa
nt
 M
or
ta
lit
y 
R
at
e
1996 2001 2006
Year
Jefferson Co., KY 1998
75
Figure 20b: Placebo Experiments – Total Infant Mortality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
G
ap
 in
 In
fa
nt
 M
or
ta
lit
y 
R
at
es
1996 2001 2006
Year
Kent Co., MI 2004
-5
0
5
G
ap
 in
 In
fa
nt
 M
or
ta
lit
y 
R
at
es
1996 2001 2006
Year
Kings Co., NY 2001
-4
-2
0
2
4
G
ap
 in
 In
fa
nt
 M
or
ta
lit
y 
R
at
es
1996 2001 2006
Year
Los Angeles Co., CA 1998
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
G
ap
 in
 In
fa
nt
 M
or
ta
lit
y 
R
at
es
1996 2001 2006
Year
Mobile Co., AL 1998
76
Figure 20c: Placebo Experiments – Total Infant Mortality 
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Figure 21a: Placebo Experiments – Black Infant Mortality 
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Figure 21b: Placebo Experiments – Black Infant Mortality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5
0
5
10
G
ap
 in
 B
la
ck
 In
fa
nt
 M
or
ta
lit
y 
R
at
es
1996 2001 2006
Year
Jefferson Co., KY 1998
-5
0
5
G
ap
 in
 B
la
ck
 In
fa
nt
 M
or
ta
lit
y 
R
at
es
1996 2001 2006
Year
Kent Co., MI 2004
-5
0
5
G
ap
 in
 B
la
ck
 In
fa
nt
 M
or
ta
lit
y 
R
at
es
1996 2001 2006
Year
Kings Co., NY 2001
-5
0
5
10
G
ap
 in
 B
la
ck
 In
fa
nt
 M
or
ta
lit
y 
R
at
es
1996 2001 2006
Year
Los Angeles Co., CA 1998
79
Figure 21c: Placebo Experiments –Black Infant Mortality 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Data for Total Infant Mortality  Data for Black Infant Mortality 
  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev 
Infant Mortality Rate  6.94  (2.24)  13.70  (3.62) 
Proportion Hispanic  0.14  (0.15)  0.13  (0.13) 
Proportion Black  0.15  (0.14)  0.23  (0.14) 
Population per Square 
Mile 
1758.79  (4277.41)  2586.33  (5650.13) 
Poverty Rates (%)  12.06  (5.29)  13.34  (4.67) 
Number of Doctors per 
Thousand People 
3.17  (1.81)  3.64  (1.94) 
Percent that did not 
Complete High School 
4.79  (7.36)  5.002  (7.341) 
Healthy Start  0.25  (0.43)  0.424  (0.494) 
Total Number of 
Counties 
193    104   
Observations  2895    1560   
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Table 2: Average Infant Mortality by Healthy Start Status 
 
  Healthy Start Counties  Non Healthy Start 
Counties 
Average infant mortality rate in 
first year of healthy start program 
 
8.55 
(2.67) 
6.56 
(2.05) 
High infant mortality rate in first 
year of healthy start program 
 
15.94  16.60 
Low infant mortality rate in first 
year of healthy start program 
 
4.49  2.20 
Average infant mortality rate one 
year prior to healthy start 
program 
 
7.91 
(2.16) 
6.59 
(2.06) 
High infant mortality rate one year 
prior to healthy start program 
13.51  16.60 
Low infant mortality rate one year 
prior to healthy start program 
 
4.69  2.20 
Average infant mortality rate two 
years prior to healthy start 
program 
 
8.30 
(2.56) 
6.57 
(2.04) 
High infant mortality rate two 
years prior to healthy start 
program 
 
14.49  16.60 
Low infant mortality rate two 
years prior to healthy start 
program 
 
3.46  2.20 
Standard deviations in brackets 
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Did not Complete High School (%)
Proportion Hispanic
Proportion Black
Population Per Sq. Mile
Number of Doctors per Capita
Number of Hospitals Per Capita
Poverty Level (%)
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10
Did not Complete High School (%)
Proportion Hispanic
Proportion Black
Population Per Sq. Mile
Number of Doctors per Capita
Number of Hospitals Per Capita
Poverty Level (%)
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10
Did not Complete High School (%)
Proportion Hispanic
Proportion Black
Population Per Sq. Mile
Number of Doctors per Capita
Number of Hospitals Per Capita
Poverty Level (%)
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10
6.21 6.10
6.38 6.32
6.04 5.96
2.96 2.94
0.02 0.02
16.18 16.01
0.26 0.26
0.20 0.20
1758.74 1751.31
8.58 9.79
8.30 9.24
0.22 0.22
0.03 0.03
18.95 17.18
9.72 9.73
0.54 0.41
1345.51 1901.73
6.32 4.35
5.82
6.42
0.17 0.17
0.03 0.06
627.01
1.94
0.01
6.36
6.98
0.07
0.06
0.06
569.41
2.10
0.01
6.28
6.98
5.75
7.03
0.08
0.06
0.07
Table 3:  Covariate Means and Outcomes Treatment 1998
Arapahoe Co., CO Synthetic Control
Fulton Co., GA Synthetic Control
Harris County, TX Synthetic Control
83
Did not Complete High School (%)
Proportion Hispanic
Proportion Black
Population Per Sq. Mile
Number of Doctors per Capita
Number of Hospitals Per Capita
Poverty Level (%)
Pre‐treatment Infant Mortality Rate
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10
Did not Complete High School (%)
Proportion Hispanic
Proportion Black
Population Per Sq. Mile
Number of Doctors per Capita
Number of Hospitals Per Capita
Poverty Level (%)
Pre‐treatment Infant Mortality Rate
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10
Did not Complete High School
Proportion Hispanic
Proportion Black
Population Per Sq. Mile
Number of Doctors per Capita
Number of Hospitals Per Capita
Poverty Level (%)
Pre‐treatment Infant Mortality Rate
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10
Milwaukee Co., WI Synthetic Control
Table 3 Continued:  Covariate Means and Outcomes  Treatment 1998
Jefferson Co., KY Synthetic Control
Los Angeles Co., CA Synthetic Control
1683.82 1226.43
3.86 3.88
0.02 0.02
0.18 0.18
0.01 0.02
0.17 0.18
6.01 7.26
0.26 0.26
0.43 0.43
12.75 12.64
7.54 7.55
6.76 7.26
0.01 0.01
21.05 21.06
5.61 5.60
0.11 0.11
1913.03 1921.52
2.66 2.66
0.06 0.06
0.24 0.24
775.26 737.67
5.16 5.89
4.97 5.64
0.15 0.15
10.37 10.37
10.40 8.93
9.38 8.76
3.31 3.24
0.02 0.02
16.40 16.27
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Did not Complete High School 
Proportion Hispanic
Proportion Black
Population Per Sq. Mile
Number of Doctors per Capita
Number of Hospitals Per Capita
Poverty Rate (%)
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10
Did not Complete High School (%)
Proportion Hispanic
Proportion Black
Population Per Sq. Mile
Number of Doctors per Capita
Number of Hospitals Per Capita
Poverty Rate (%)
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10
Did not Complete High School (%)
Proportion Hispanic
Proportion Black
Population Per Sq. Mile
Number of Doctors per Capita
Number of Hospitals Per Capita
Poverty Rate (%)
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10
7.88 7.10
8.26 7.65
0.02 0.02
11.43 11.20
8.59 8.47
0.09 0.09
431.92 408.88
2.52 2.47
5.95 6.30
0.12 0.12
0.06 0.06
8.68 8.56
7.00 6.93
5.72 6.37
599.88 589.89
2.12 2.10
0.02 0.02
0.10 0.10
0.03 0.03
0.05 0.05
12.05 12.02
9.60 11.83
8.13 10.97
2.64 3.73
0.02 0.03
20.88 17.56
0.01
0.33 0.53
241.67 497.37
Table 3 Continued:  Covariate Means and Outcomes  Treatment 1998
Mobile Co. , AL Synthetic Control
Polk Co., IA Synthetic Control
Sedgwick Co., KS Synthetic Control
0.21 0.16
0.01
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Did not Complete High School (%)
Proportion Hispanic
Proportion Black
Population Per Sq. Mile
Number of Doctors per Capita
Number of Hospitals Per Capita
Poverty Rate (%)
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10
Did not Complete High School (%)
Proportion Hispanic
Proportion Black
Population Per Sq. Mile
Number of Doctors per Capita
Number of Hospitals Per Capita
Poverty Rate (%)
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10 7.38 6.14
11.70 11.66
7.14 7.12
7.26 6.85
1461.59 1451.75
1.59 1.57
0.02 0.02
0.17 0.17
0.14 0.14
0.13 0.13
10.48 10.49
8.25 9.97
7.46 9.33
1.27 2.61
0.02 0.02
16.20 16.19
0.02 0.03
0.29 0.29
391.92 444.34
0.18 0.18
Tarrant Co., TX Synthetic Control
Table 3 Continued:  Covariate Means and Outcomes  Treatment 1998
St. Clair Co., IL Synthetic Control
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Did not Complete High School (%) 0.15 0.15
Proportion Hispanic 0.18 0.18
Proportion Black 0.19 0.19
Population Per Sq. Mile 1672.66 1703.64
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.56 2.46
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.01
Poverty Level (%) 11.38 11.41
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 5.65 5.66
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 4.78 5.34
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 4.36 4.97
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.16 0.16
Proportion Hispanic 0.04 0.05
Proportion Black 0.28 0.26
Population Per Sq. Mile 793.51 1611.49
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.74 2.78
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 15.25 14.71
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 9.91 9.91
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 10.88 8.75
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 9.12 8.12
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.17 0.15
Proportion Hispanic 0.01 0.03
Proportion Black 0.25 0.43
Population Per Sq. Mile 692.12 904.36
Number of Doctors per Capita 5.34 3.07
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 11.00 12.97
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 11.40 11.40
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 8.75 10.82
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 11.07 9.97
Table 4:  Covariate Means and Outcomes Treatment 1999
Alameda Co., CA Synthetic Control
Duval Co., FL Synthetic Control
Forsyth Co., NC Synthetic Control
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Did not Complete High School (%) 0.17 0.17
Proportion Hispanic 0.01 0.03
Proportion Black 0.27 0.27
Population Per Sq. Mile 582.01 900.45
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.42 2.33
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.01
Poverty Level (%) 11.35 11.25
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 9.43 9.43
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 8.85 9.28
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 9.99 8.40
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.18 0.18
Proportion Hispanic 0.17 0.17
Proportion Black 0.15 0.15
Population Per Sq. Mile 718.18 726.53
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.84 2.84
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 7.81 7.82
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 7.97 7.70
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 8.96 7.74
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 8.42 7.22
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.13 0.15
Proportion Hispanic 0.06 0.06
Proportion Black 0.15 0.17
Population Per Sq. Mile 877.44 396.98
Number of Doctors per Capita 3.69 3.72
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.03 0.03
Poverty Level (%) 15.92 14.69
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 9.32 9.33
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 9.71 7.82
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 8.13 8.69
Synthetic ControlOklahoma Co., OK
Synthetic ControlHillsborough Co., FL
Guilford Co., NC Synthetic Control
Table 4 Continued:  Covariate Means and Outcomes  Treatment 1999
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Did not Complete High School (%) 0.28 0.15
Proportion Hispanic 0.02 0.02
Proportion Black 0.52 0.24
Population Per Sq. Mile 5212.51 538.94
Number of Doctors per Capita 14.03 3.00
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.07 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 25.80 15.39
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 14.10 13.56
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 12.11 9.54
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 10.79 9.41
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.16 0.16
Proportion Hispanic 0.06 0.06
Proportion Black 0.03 0.03
Population Per Sq. Mile 458.89 459.26
Number of Doctors per Capita 3.19 3.19
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Rate (%) 10.28 10.29
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 5.84 5.84
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 5.49 5.35
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10 5.40 5.54
Table 4 Continued:  Covariate Means and Outcomes  Treatment 1999
St. Louis Co., MO Synthetic Control
Worcester Co., FL Synthetic Control
89
Franklin Co., OH Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.11 0.13
Proportion Hispanic 0.01 0.02
Proportion Black 0.18 0.19
Population Per Sq. Mile 1876.73 1218.75
Number of Doctors per Capita 3.26 2.52
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.01
Poverty Level (%) 11.15 11.07
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 8.83 8.81
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 8.28 8.56
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +8 8.58 8.58
Shelby Co., TN Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.17 0.16
Proportion Hispanic 0.01 0.01
Proportion Black 0.46 0.47
Population Per Sq. Mile 1106.88 336.93
Number of Doctors per Capita 3.45 3.94
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.03
Poverty Level (%) 16.07 18.11
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 12.95 12.80
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 12.67 12.70
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +8 12.59 10.74
Westmoreland Co., PA Synthetic Control
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.14 0.13
Proportion Hispanic 0.01 0.02
Proportion Black 0.02 0.04
Population Per Sq. Mile 359.90 670.68
Number of Doctors per Capita 1.60 3.05
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 9.88 9.81
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 4.87 4.87
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 5.07 5.18
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +8 6.94 5.28
Table 5:  Covariate Means and Outcomes Treatment 2000
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Genesee Co., MI Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.15 0.14
Proportion Hispanic 0.02 0.03
Proportion Black 0.21 0.45
Population Per Sq. Mile 671.39 914.83
Number of Doctors per Capita 1.97 2.82
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 13.68 12.95
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 11.38 11.57
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 10.41 10.29
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +7 8.98 10.16
Kings Co., NY Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.28 0.29
Proportion Hispanic 0.23 0.39
Proportion Black 0.41 0.36
Population Per Sq. Mile 23810.52 17177.46
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.76 2.48
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.01
Poverty Level (%) 24.68 24.48
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 6.75 6.78
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 5.83 6.42
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +7 5.20 6.55
Maricopa Co., AZ Synthetic Control
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.15 0.19
Proportion Hispanic 0.21 0.21
Proportion Black 0.04 0.04
Population Per Sq. Mile 304.19 369.33
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.09 1.88
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.01
Poverty Level (%) 11.77 11.79
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 6.73 6.74
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 6.27 6.14
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +7 6.04 6.11
Table 6:  Covariate Means and Outcomes Treatment 2001
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Mercer Co., NJ Synthetic Control
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.13 0.14
Proportion Hispanic 0.08 0.08
Proportion Black 0.21 0.20
Population Per Sq. Mile 1464.39 1234.78
Number of Doctors per Capita 3.52 3.62
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 8.70 9.03
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 8.22 8.21
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 7.78 7.18
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +7 8.86 6.86
Table 6 Continued:  Covariate Means and Outcomes  Treatment 2001
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East Baton Rouge Co., LA Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.13 0.14
Proportion Hispanic 0.02 0.05
Proportion Black 0.38 0.47
Population Per Sq. Mile 850.19 1094.69
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.94 2.93
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.03 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 15.83 10.24
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 10.27 10.27
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 3 10.77 9.68
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 6 10.82 9.44
Bexar Co., Tx Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.21 0.23
Proportion Hispanic 0.55 0.36
Proportion Black 0.07 0.06
Population Per Sq. Mile 1085.55 282.55
Number of Doctors per Capita 3.01 2.06
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 17.26 17.48
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 6.15 6.12
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 3 6.42 7.03
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 6 6.06 6.07
Table 7:  Covariate Means and Outcomes Treatment 2002
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Kent Co., MI (2004) Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.13 0.14
Proportion Hispanic 0.06 0.04
Proportion Black 0.09 0.19
Population Per Sq. Mile 645.07 696.31
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.50 2.70
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 8.86 9.57
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 8.37 8.36
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 2 7.31 8.89
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 4 6.73 7.93
Monroe Co., NY (2006) Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.12 0.12
Proportion Hispanic 0.05 0.05
Proportion Black 0.14 0.15
Population Per Sq. Mile 534.70 871.70
Number of Doctors per Capita 4.38 3.03
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 12.06 10.87
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 7.04 6.88
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 2 7.92 7.05
Table 8:  Covariate Means and Outcomes Treatment 2004 and 2006
94
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.07 0.12
Proportion Hispanic 0.06 0.07
Proportion Black 0.06 0.11
Population Per Sq. Mile 569.40 514.70
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.10 0.88
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.00
Poverty Level (%) 6.28 6.38
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 21.33 19.37
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 15.46 15.46
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10 13.58 13.29
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.17 0.17
Proportion Hispanic 0.03 0.02
Proportion Black 0.54 0.50
Population Per Sq. Mile 1345.51 791.34
Number of Doctors per Capita 6.32 4.29
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.03 0.03
Poverty Level (%) 18.95 19.02
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 13.77 13.77
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 12.83 14.14
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10 11.76 12.59
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.22 0.22
Proportion Hispanic 0.26 0.26
Proportion Black 0.20 0.20
Population Per Sq. Mile 1758.74 1758.91
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.96 2.98
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 16.18 16.17
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 10.45 10.45
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 11.26 11.31
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10 10.42 11.15
Table 9:  Covariate Means and Outcomes Treatment 1998 (Black)
Harris County, TX Synthetic Control
Arapahoe Co., CO Synthetic Control
Fulton Co., GA Synthetic Control
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Did not Complete High School (%) 0.18 0.18
Proportion Hispanic 0.01 0.02
Proportion Black 0.17 0.18
Population Per Sq. Mile 1683.82 834.19
Number of Doctors per Capita 3.86 3.48
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 12.75 12.75
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 13.13 13.16
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 11.66 14.51
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10 9.41 12.58
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.26 0.26
Proportion Hispanic 0.43 0.43
Proportion Black 0.11 0.16
Population Per Sq. Mile 1913.03 1878.91
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.66 2.75
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 21.05 20.47
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 11.81 11.81
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 11.45 12.38
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10 10.35 10.5
Did not Complete High School 0.15 0.17
Proportion Hispanic 0.06 0.06
Proportion Black 0.24 0.25
Population Per Sq. Mile 775.26 571.05
Number of Doctors per Capita 3.31 3.02
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 16.40 15.78
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 16.74 16.74
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 17.83 16.69
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10 14.49 15.52
Jefferson Co., KY Synthetic Control
Table 9 Continued:  Covariate Means and Outcomes  Treatment 1998 (Black)
Los Angeles Co., CA Synthetic Control
Milwaukee Co., WI Synthetic Control
96
Did not Complete High School 0.21 0.2
Proportion Hispanic 0.01 0.08
Proportion Black 0.33 0.33
Population Per Sq. Mile 241.67 219.66
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.64 4.99
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.03
Poverty Rate (%) 20.88 18.92
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 17.18 17.18
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 13.23 16.98
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10 10.46 12.41
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.12 0.15
Proportion Hispanic 0.06 0.06
Proportion Black 0.09 0.10
Population Per Sq. Mile 431.92 866.77
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.52 3.45
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.01
Poverty Rate (%) 11.43 11.42
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 18.05 18.04
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 14.47 16.17
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10 18.17 13.89
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.18 0.17
Proportion Hispanic 0.02 0.07
Proportion Black 0.29 0.29
Population Per Sq. Mile 391.92 371.47
Number of Doctors per Capita 1.27 1.62
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Rate (%) 16.20 15.90
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 16.37 16.39
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 11.05 17.82
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10 11.64 13.95
Sedgwick Co., KS Synthetic Control
Table 9 Continued:  Covariate Means and Outcomes  Treatment 1998 (Black)
Mobile Co. , AL Synthetic Control
St. Clair Co., IL Synthetic Control
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Did not Complete High School (%) 0.17 0.17
Proportion Hispanic 0.14 0.14
Proportion Black 0.13 0.13
Population Per Sq. Mile 1461.59 769.60
Number of Doctors per Capita 1.59 1.76
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Rate (%) 11.70 11.68
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 12.57 12.56
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 14.8 11.37
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +10 13.39 11.78
Tarrant Co., TX Synthetic Control
Table 9 Continued:  Covariate Means and Outcomes  Treatment 1998 (Black)
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Did not Complete High School (%) 0.15 0.15
Proportion Hispanic 0.18 0.18
Proportion Black 0.19 0.19
Population Per Sq. Mile 1672.66 1513.48
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.56 2.54
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.01
Poverty Level (%) 11.38 11.35
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 11.28 11.27
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 8.68 10.58
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 8.46 10.00
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.16 0.16
Proportion Hispanic 0.04 0.04
Proportion Black 0.28 0.27
Population Per Sq. Mile 793.51 666.66
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.74 2.91
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 15.25 14.99
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 15.96 15.96
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 15.86 15.79
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 13.28 12.74
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.17 0.12
Proportion Hispanic 0.01 0.09
Proportion Black 0.25 0.11
Population Per Sq. Mile 692.12 504.17
Number of Doctors per Capita 5.34 0.94
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.01
Poverty Level (%) 11.00 7.08
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 21.12 21.33
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 17.36 14.35
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 21.14 13.25
Table 10:  Covariate Means and Outcomes Treatment 1999 (Black)
Forsyth Co., NC Synthetic Control
Alameda Co., CA Synthetic Control
Duval Co., FL Synthetic Control
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Did not Complete High School (%) 0.17 0.15
Proportion Hispanic 0.01 0.03
Proportion Black 0.27 0.19
Population Per Sq. Mile 582.01 1182.67
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.42 3.22
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 11.35 11.35
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 13.64 14.83
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 16.43 16.60
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 15.34 12.65
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.18 0.18
Proportion Hispanic 0.17 0.17
Proportion Black 0.15 0.15
Population Per Sq. Mile 718.18 702.21
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.84 2.84
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 15.07 15.04
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 15.05 15.03
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 17.27 14.51
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 17.17 12.04
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.13 0.20
Proportion Hispanic 0.06 0.18
Proportion Black 0.15 0.10
Population Per Sq. Mile 877.44 587.99
Number of Doctors per Capita 3.69 3.98
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.03 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 15.92 16.61
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 14.59 15.25
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 15.93 16.42
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 15.09 13.39
Guilford Co., NC Synthetic Control
Table 10 Continued:  Covariate Means and Outcomes  Treatment 1999 (Black)
Hillsborough Co., FL Synthetic Control
Oklahoma Co., OK Synthetic Control
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Did not Complete High School (%) 0.28 0.19
Proportion Hispanic 0.02 0.04
Proportion Black 0.52 0.34
Population Per Sq. Mile 5212.512 1580.69
Number of Doctors per Capita 14.03 5.70
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.07 0.03
Poverty Level (%) 25.80 16.48
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 18.43 18.06
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 14.71 13.54
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 9 14.12 11.84
Table 10 Continued:  Covariate Means and Outcomes  Treatment 1999 (Black)
St. Louis Co., MO Synthetic Control
101
Franklin Co., OH Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.11 0.13
Proportion Hispanic 0.01 0.02
Proportion Black 0.18 0.18
Population Per Sq. Mile 1876.73 1027.79
Number of Doctors per Capita 3.26 3.26
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.01
Poverty Level (%) 11.15 11.10
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 15.11 15.11
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 13.38 15.23
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +8 13.20 12.80
Shelby Co., TN Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.17 0.16
Proportion Hispanic 0.01 0.07
Proportion Black 0.48 0.21
Population Per Sq. Mile 1106.88 575.50
Number of Doctors per Capita 3.45 2.90
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 16.08 15.32
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 17.17 17.03
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 16.8 16.68
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +8 17.23 14.12
Table 11:  Covariate Means and Outcomes Treatment 2000 (Black)
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Genesee Co., MI Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.15 0.11
Proportion Hispanic 0.02 0.05
Proportion Black 0.21 0.14
Population Per Sq. Mile 671.39 970.26
Number of Doctors per Capita 1.97 3.23
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.01
Poverty Level (%) 13.86 7.66
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 20.68 17.98
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 14.75 16.43
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +7 15.97 13.69
Kings Co., NY Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.28 0.29
Proportion Hispanic 0.23 0.36
Proportion Black 0.41 0.37
Population Per Sq. Mile 23810.52 13844.78
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.76 3.3
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 24.68 24.39
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 10.57 10.57
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 9.29 10.43
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +7 8.65 9.54
Maricopa Co., AZ Synthetic Control
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.15 0.15
Proportion Hispanic 0.21 0.10
Proportion Black 0.04 0.13
Population Per Sq. Mile 304.19 910.7
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.09 2.51
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.01
Poverty Level (%) 11.77 12.09
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 16.41 16.39
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 12.01 13.82
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +7 13.92 12.61
Table 12:  Covariate Means and Outcomes Treatment 2001 (Black)
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Mercer Co., NJ Synthetic Control
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.14 0.16
Proportion Hispanic 0.08 0.07
Proportion Black 0.21 0.21
Population Per Sq. Mile 1464.39 838.01
Number of Doctors per Capita 3.52 4.16
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 8.70 11.47
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 16.39 16.4
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 5 15.90 12.07
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 +7 17.51 11.71
Table 12 Continued:  Covariate Means and Outcomes  Treatment 2001 (Black)
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East Baton Rouge Co., LA Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.13 0.15
Proportion Hispanic 0.02 0.04
Proportion Black 0.38 0.19
Population Per Sq. Mile 850.19 506.63
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.94 2.23
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.03 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 15.83 10.75
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 13.78 13.95
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 3 15.39 16.17
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 6 14.79 13.40
Bexar Co., Tx Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.21 0.21
Proportion Hispanic 0.55 0.18
Proportion Black 0.07 0.23
Population Per Sq. Mile 1085.55 7085.12
Number of Doctors per Capita 3.01 3.07
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.02 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 17.26 16.02
Pre-treatment Infant Mortality Rate 11.01 11.21
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 3 11.79 13.04
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 6 9.97 11.99
Table 13:  Covariate Means and Outcomes Treatment 2002 (Black)
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Kent Co., MI (2004) Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.13 0.21
Proportion Hispanic 0.06 0.26
Proportion Black 0.09 0.09
Population Per Sq. Mile 645.07 416.87
Number of Doctors per Capita 2.50 2.21
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.02
Poverty Level (%) 8.86 16.58
Pre‐treatment Infant Mortality Rate 16.64 16.82
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 2 13.79 15.93
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 4 12.80 12.85
Monroe Co., NY (2006) Synthetic Control 
Did not Complete High School (%) 0.12 0.10
Proportion Hispanic 0.05 0.06
Proportion Black 0.14 0.16
Population Per Sq. Mile 534.70 1413.94
Number of Doctors per Capita 4.38 2.60
Number of Hospitals Per Capita 0.01 0.01
Poverty Level (%) 12.06 8.10
Pre‐treatment Infant Mortality Rate 16.26 15.30
Inf. Mortality Rate at T0 + 2 16.48 13.17
Table 14:  Covariate Means and Outcomes Treatment 2004 and 2006 (Black)
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics by Healthy Start Effectiveness (Total)
Group 1 Group 2 Mean Difference Test
Infant Mortality Rate 8.39 8.14 0.38
(1.47) (2.28)
Proportion Hispanic 0.04 0.14 0.00
(0.03) (0.14)
Proportion Black 0.28 0.20 0.00
(0.13) (0.14)
Pop. per Square Mile 907.76 2114.82 0.04
(612.13) (4732.45)
Poverty Rates 14.56 13.71 0.14
(3.36) (4.33)
Number of Doctors 3.29 3.19 0.63
(1.40) (1.62)
Number of Hospitals 0.02 0.02 0.65
(0.00) (0.01)
% High School Dropout 0.15 0.15 0.20
(0.03) (0.05)
Standard deviations in parentheses. Group 1 consists of Healthy Start programs that had a reduction in
infant mortality rate in the area of operation. Group 2 consists of programs in areas where there was no
reduction in infant mortality rates. The third column shows the p value for a test of the difference in means.
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Table 16: Descriptive Statistics by Healthy Start Effectiveness (Black)
Group 1 Group 2 Mean Difference Test
Infant Mortality Rate 13.52 14.77 0.00
(2.20) (3.00)
Proportion Hispanic 0.07 0.14 0.00
(0.08) (0.15)
Proportion Black 0.24 0.22 0.54
(0.15) (0.13)
Pop. per Square Mile 814.67 2430.23 0.01
(596.34) (5103.99)
Poverty Rates 14.18 14.44 0.61
(3.20) (4.29)
Number of Doctors 3.10 3.36 0.22
(1.35) (1.70)
Number of Hospitals 0.02 0.02 0.63
(0.00) (0.01)
% High School Dropout 0.15 0.16 0.02
(0.03) (0.05)
Standard deviations in parentheses. Group 1 consists of Healthy Start programs that had a reduction in
infant mortality rate in the area of operation. Group 2 consists of programs in areas where there was no
reduction in infant mortality rates. The third column shows the p value for a test of the difference in means.
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Chapter 3
Health and The Minimum Wage
Introduction
The empirical literature on the impact of minimum wage legislation has mostly focused
on its effect on job availability for low wage earners. The results have been mixed with some
studies finding an increase in employment for this group1 and others finding an adverse
effect.2 However, the job availability outcome is just one facet of the effect of minimum wage
policy. A change in minimum wage could also affect the non-wage job attributes such as the
provision of health insurance and other fringe benefits.
There has been some literature which has looked at the relationship between the minimum
wage and these non wage attributes. Acemoglu and Pischke (2003) examine the minimum
wage effect on on-the-job training. They find no evidence that it leads to a decrease in such
training in some specifications and some evidence that it leads to increased training in other
specifications. The effect of wage policies on the provision of other job benefits has also
been examined. Simon and Kaestner (2004) find no effect of minimum wage variation on
the generosity of fringe benefits (such as health insurance and pensions). However, further
study showed that there is a reduction in health insurance coverage for firms not subject to
non-discrimination laws (laws that require firms to provide similar insurance for all levels of
employees) while firms subject to such laws show no such reduction (Marks 2011).
This study contributes to the minimum wage literature by examining its effect on health
outcomes and health in general. Income is an input in the production of health and the
acquisition of other health inputs. It would be plausible then that an exogenous change
in income would affect individual health and the use of health care services. I use the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data, published by the United States
1Card (1992a, 1992b), Katz and Krueger (1992) and Machin and Manning (1994).
2Neumark and Wascher (1992), Deere, Murphy and Welch (1995), Baker, Benjamin and Stanger (1999),
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and Burkhauser, Couch and Wittenburg (2000).
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Census Bureau, to study the effect of minimum wage changes on certain health measures
for the period 1996-2012. The variation in minimum wage is exogenous and so is suitable
for measuring the effect of wage changes on health. The results obtained in this analysis
indicate that an increase in the real minimum wage led to a significant increase in the use
of routine healthcare services for adults with less than a high school education, with no
significant effect on health status. Minimum wage policy also provides some evidence of
increased healthcare use for minors in lower education households. There is no observed
impact on higher education adults or their dependents.
Previous Literature
There are few studies that look at the effect of minimum wage on health. The studies
that do exist mainly focus on minimum wage effects on BMI (Body Mass Index) and obesity.
The minimum wage could affect these variables through food prices. A large proportion of
minimum wage earners work in the food service industry. Thus, a minimum wage change
would affect restaurant food prices. Indeed Aaronson et al (2008) find that restaurant prices
rise in response to a minimum wage increase. This rise in restaurant prices could affect
obesity rates by reducing consumption of ”fast food”. Chou et al (2003) find that the drop
in real fast food prices, along with other factors, is positively associated with body mass
index (BMI) and being overweight. Meltzer and Chen (2009) also find that a one dollar
decrease in the real mininum wage is associated with a 0.06 increase in BMI. However, there
have also been studies3 which found no effect of minimum wage and fast food prices on BMI
and obesity.
Other studies have looked at the effects of income changes on consumption patterns
and health. Shapiro (2004) shows that Supplemental Nutrition Assistance (SNAP) or ”food
stamp” recipients experience a decline in caloric intake over the month due to the benefits
being exhausted. Mastrobuoni and Weinberg (2009) also show the retirees with only social
3Kim (2004), Cotti and Tefft (2012)
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security income consume fewer calories at the end of the benefit period than retirees with
additional savings. Apart from its effect on consumption patterns, income changes and levels
can also mental effects. Shah et al (2012) show that resource scarcity can lead to behaviors
which exacerbate poverty conditions while Mani et al (2013) find that being in poverty
impedes cognitive function. Other health outcomes that could be affected by minimum
wage policy and other income programs include family formation. Sen and Ariizumi (2013)
find that an increase in minimum wage in Canada is associated with increased teen marriage
rates and fertility among married teens. All these studies indicate that various income
policies could affect health. My paper is a contribution to this literature.
Data
The primary data for this study is obtained from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). SIPP is a national sample of the civilian non-institutionalized popu-
lation. It consists of panels which take place over four years. In this study the 1996, 2001,
2004 and 2008 panels are used. Each panel is a multistage stratified sample of the US popu-
lation. Every individual is interviewed a maximum of 12 times over a four year period about
core questions involving issues like family income, composition and participation in various
government programs over the past 4 months. In addition the individuals are also asked
topical questions about certain issues in some interviews. Thus, the core questions are asked
in every interview (known as a wave) while each set of topical questions is asked in selected
waves. The topical module that used here is called the Medical Expenses and Utilization of
Health Care module. It contains information on health care use as well as health measures.
This topical module is administered roughly once a year. In this case the data used comes
from the years 1996-1999, 2001-2005 and 2010-2011 for a total of 11 years.
The SIPP data used for the analysis is divided into four groups. The first group consists
of all adults aged 19 and above who have not completed high school. This group has 90203
observations. When this sample is restricted to those below retirement age (below age 65)
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there are 59797 observations. When the sample is further restricted to younger adults (those
below age 28) there are 12082 observations. The second group consists of all adults aged
19 and above with at least a college degree. This group has a sample size of 143026 which
drops to 124369 when just the working age population is considered and 13269 observations
when the sample is limited to those below age 28. The third group consists of minors (aged
15 and below) residing in households in which the highest level of education is less than
a high school degree. This group has a sample size of 19852. The fourth group is minors
in households where at least one individual has a college degree at a minimum. There are
61788 observations in this group.
Additional explanatory variables were also obtained from other sources. Unemployment
rates by state and year were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website. Data
on minimum wage rates by state as of January 1st of each year were obtained from the
Department of Labor website. The minimum wage data from each year is converted to
1996 dollars. The change in the nominal and real minimum wage over the sample period is
illustrated in figures 1 and 2. The change in the average, highest and lowest minimum wage
for each time period demonstrates the variation over time and across states, particularly for
the real minimum wage.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for adults by education level. From the table
adults with higher educational attainment levels are more likely to report better health in
general. The highly educated also report fewer number of sick days. In terms of health care
utilization, the more educated are more likely report the use of routine healthcare services.
The more educated are also more likely to have private health insurance coverage and less
likely to be covered by Medicaid and Medicare.
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for younger adults and minors. Young adults with
a college degree also report better indicators of health and greater use of routine healthcare
services. Children in households with at least one college graduate are more likely to report
very good or excellent health. They are also more likely to have had at least one medical
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provider visit and dental provider visit in the last year. When it comes to insurance coverage,
the children of the better educated are more likely to be covered by private health insurance
and than those in lower educated households.
Empirical Specification
This article looks at the effect of minimum wage policy on health. As stated previously,
minimum wage policy could affect health directly through its effect on income for minimum
wage earners. It could also affect health indirectly through its effect on the prices of other
health inputs such as fast food. These effects are examined using the following regression
model:
Yijt = α0 + α1Mjt + α2Uijt + α3MjtUijt + α4Xijt + µi + ηt + ijt (1)
where Yijt is the outcome variable for individual i in state j in year t. Mjt is the minimum
wage in state j and year t while Uijt is an indicator variable to denote the unemployment
status of the individual (the unemployment status of a household in the case of minors). The
outcome variables are a dummy variable for good or better health, sick days in the last year,
visits to medical providers, visits to dental providers and overnight hospital stays. These
are discussed in further detail in table 1. Xijt is a vector of personal characteristics such as
age, race, sex and insurance coverage status.The model also includes state fixed effects (µj)
and year fixed effects (ηt). The individual fixed effects control for any individual specific
time invariant variables while the year fixed effects control for year specific variables across
states. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.The regression model is estimated
separately for each of the groups discussed.
Employment status (U) can also be modeled as a function of the minimum wage and
macroeconomic measures of the business cycle such as the state unemployment rate. This is
shown below.
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Uijt = β0 + β1Mjt + β2UNjt + α4Xijt + ζj + κt + νijt (2)
where UNjt is the state unemployment rate in state j at time t. As shown in equation 2
the minimum wage could also have an impact on unemployment status. Therefore, the full
effect of a minimum wage change from equation 1 can be denoted as
∂Yijt
∂Mjt
= α1 + α2
∂Uijt
∂Mjt
+ α3(Uijt +Mjt
∂Uijt
∂Mjt
) (3)
where
∂Uijt
∂Mjt
is obtained from equation 2.
Another approach to estimate the causal effect is with instrumental variables. In this
case UN and M*UN would be used as instruments for U and M*U. However, the first stage
results indicate that there is a weak instrument problem in this case.
Variation in the minimum wage can affect individual health status and health care out-
comes through two different avenues. The first can be described as an income effect. An
increase in the minimum wage will raise the earnings for those directly affected by minimum
wage policy. This rise in income will allow for the purchase more goods and services in
general.
There is also a price effect associated with a change in minimum wage policy. A rise
in the minimum wage could lead to an increase in the personnel costs for industries with a
large proportion of minimum wage earners in their labor force, leading to a rise in the price
of their manufactured goods. The price effect is likely to affect the population at large while
the income effect will be limited to those whose earnings are directly affected by minimum
wage policy and are currently employed.
The hypothesized relationship of the minimum wage is going to vary by education level
and also by the variable of interest (health status or healthcare use). The first group to be
examined is those with less than a high school education and their dependents. This group
will face the price effect and those that are employed will also face an income effect. In the
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case of healthcare use the income effect is likely to lead to increased use of these services.
The price effect is unlikely to lead to a rise in the use of healthcare services as the proportion
of minimum wage earners in the health care industry is low. For instance, an analysis by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008) shows that just 2.2% of hourly paid workers in the
healthcare sector earn the minimum wage. There could be a rise in the use of healthcare
services as individuals shift their purchases away from goods that have seen a relative rise in
price. Overall the price effect is positive while the income effect is positive and is likely to be
dominant for the lower education group. This implies that the α1 coefficient will be positive
in the healthcare regressions for the lower income households. In the case of employment
status, there would be a drop in earnings for the unemployed which would decrease their
use of healthcare services. On the other hand there could also be a rise in healthcare use for
the unemployed due to the extra free time now available to use such services. Overall the
sign of α2 in the healthcare regressions is uncertain. The sign for α3 is hypothesized to be
negative. The unemployed are less likely to be affected by the minimum wage than those
currently employed.
When the dependent variable is a measure of health status, the hypothesized coefficient
signs will be different in some cases. The coefficient for the minimum wage (α1) will remain
positive but the expected sign for α2 will be uncertain. Prior research on the relationship
between economic conditions and health is mixed. Work by Ruhm (1996) based on data
from 1972-1991 showed health status to be procyclical. However, studies using more recent
data have shown that measures of health status, in this case overall mortality, have become
unrelated to macroeconomic conditions (Ruhm 2015), with some measures remaining pro-
cyclical while others have become countercyclical. Colman and Dave (2014) find an overall
decrease in physical activity due to being unemployed. They posit that this is due to a
substantial proportion of job losses occurring in manual labor. The sign of the α3 coefficient
in the health status regression is also uncertain. For the unemployed a rise in minimum wage
would lead to a reduction in the purchase of goods such as fast food and cigarettes (due to a
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price effect) which are harmful to health, but it could also curtail the consumption of other
goods that could be beneficial.
Moving on to the healthcare regressions for the higher education group, the α1 coefficient
in equation 1 will be positive because of a price effect but small since there is no income
effect. The expected signs for unemployment status and the interaction term will also be
similar to those for the lower education group (an uncertain sign for α2 and a negative sign
for α3). Overall, the signs of the coefficients are similar for both groups but the magnitudes
will be larger for the lower education group.
In the case of health status measures the α1 coefficient will be positive but with a small
magnitude, as the higher education group will not be earners of the minimum wage. The α2
coefficient for employment status will have an uncertain sign. As noted above the relationship
between economic conditions and health status is mixed. There could be an improvement
in health due to more time to invest in health. There could also be adverse effects due to
a decrease in material resources for health investment. As in the case for those with lower
education, the sign of α3 will also be uncertain.
Identification in the model comes from state level variation in the minimum wage. It is
assumed in this model that unmeasured variables which vary by state year are not correlated
with minimum wage.
The main aim of this approach is to compare health and health care outcomes across
groups separated by educational attainment. Changes in minimum wage are predicted to
affect these groups differently in terms of the sign and magnitude. This model is a test of
these theoretical predictions.
Results
Table 4 shows the results for adults with general health as the dependent variable. The
top panel shows the results for the lower education group. The first column shows the
results for the sample of all adults with less than a high school degree. The results show no
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significant effect of the minimum wage on general health for the employed. The full effect of
a change in the minimum wage, which is obtained using equation 3, is also not significant.
The second column shows the results for lower education adults of working age. The results
generally show no significant effect of minimum wage for the working population. However
the full effect also indicates no significant effect of the minimum wage. The third column
displays the results for younger adults with less education. The minimum wage effects are
also not significant for the employed and overall. These younger adult estimates are similar
to those for the sample of all working age adults. The lower panel shows the results for college
graduates. The estimates show no significant effect of minimum wage on the employed or
overall. There is also no significant effect of being unemployed on general health.
Table 5 looks at the results with sick days as the dependent variable. The sample used
here is limited to those that report less than 30 sick days. There is no significant minimum
wage effect for the employed in the lower education or higher education groups. The full
effect of a minimum wage change is not significant as well. Unemployment status also has
no significant effect on sick days for any group. In summary, the variation in the minimum
wage does not significantly affect any of the measures of health examined.
The effect of minimum wage policy on health care use for adults is shown in Tables 6, 7
and 8. Table 6 looks at its effect on the probability of a medical provider visit. The results
for high school dropouts show larger effects for the younger groups. For the full sample of
high school dropouts there is a 2.6 percentage point increase in the probability of a medical
provider visit for the employed due to a one dollar increase in the minimum wage, although
this is not significant. For working age adults with less than a high school education, there is
a significant 4.2 percentage point increase in the probability of a medical provider visit for the
employed. The full effect of the minimum wage increase is a significant 4.3 percentage point
rise in the probability of a medical provider visit. The estimates for younger adults show a
significant 8.9 percentage point increase in the probability of a provider visit for the employed
and a 8.5 percentage point increase full effect for working age adults. For college graduates
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the variation in the minimum wage has no significant effect. These results overall confirm
that there is a larger impact of minimum wage policy on the lower education population.
The effect of minimum wage policy on hospital stays is shown in Table 7. Minimum wage
policy has no significant effect on the use this more intensive healthcare service.
Table 8 shows the effect of minimum wage policy on dental provider visits. For the lower
education group there is no significant minimum wage effect for the sample of all adults
or working age adults. On the other hand the results for adults below age 28 indicate a
significant 11.1 percentage point increase in the probability of a dental provider visit for
those employed. The full effect for all lower education adults is a 10.6 percentage point
increase in the probability of a dental visit. For college graduates the specifications show no
significant effects on any of the three groups.
Overall, the results for healthcare services indicate greater use by high school dropouts.
In particular there is greater use of routine healthcare services by the lower education group
due to a rise in the minimum wage, while there is no effect on the use of more intensive
services such as hospital stays. This indicates that minimum wage policy has a greater effect
on those with lower education levels who are likely to earn the minimum wage.
Table 9 shows the estimates for dependents with self reported health as the dependent
variable. For both groups of dependents, there is no significant impact of minimum wage
policy on the health status of dependents with at least one employed guardian. The full
effect for all children is also not significant for both groups.
The use of medical services by minors is discussed in tables 10, 11 and 12. For medical
provider visits there is no significant minimum wage effect for either group of dependents.
It is a possibility that guardians prevent their dependents from forgoing care by expending
their scarce resource on them first, which would tend to smooth the consumption of routine
medical care and lead to no observed effects for those in lower education households. There
is also no minimum wage impact on hospitals for either group of dependents.
Table 12 looks at the relationship between minimum wage variation and the probability
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of a dental provider visit for children. There is a significant minimum wage effect on dental
provider visits for children in lower education households. For those in households with at
least one employed adult there is a 9.4 percentage point increase in the probability of a dental
provider visit. For all dependents in lower education households there is a 8.3 percentage
point increase in the probability of a dental visit. There is no significant impact on children
in higher education households. This result also provides evidence that minimum wage policy
has a larger effect on lower education individuals and households.
To obtain the full effect of a change in the minimum wage, equation 2 must also be
estimated. The results are shown on Table 13. There are generally no significant effects on
employment status with the exception of the estimates for dependents in lower education
households. In households with dependents where the highest level of education is less than
high school, there is a 6.7 percentage point increase in the probability of no employed adults
due to a one dollar increase in the minimum wage.
Conclusion
The factors that determine population health are becoming more important over time
as the size of the health care sector grows in the United States. There has been extensive
research on the effect of public policies on health and the cost of health care. Variation in
the minimum wage is one such policy.
This article looks at the effect of variations in the minimum wage in the United States on
various measures of health and health care use. Using data over 1996-2011 from SIPP, the
article finds evidence that increases in the minimum wage led to a rise in the use of healthcare
services by lower educated adults and their dependents. In particular there is increased use of
routine healthcare services such as medical and dental provider visits. However this increased
healthcare use is not accompanied with an observed improvement in health status.
These findings suggest that minimum wage policy could increase the use of preventive
care, which helps to reduce the need for more intensive and expensive healthcare services.
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These benefits must be weighed against the potential adverse effects on employment out-
comes for minimum wage recipients. The effects on other populations that are not directly
impacted by the minimum wage increases but could face indirect adverse effects due to price
increases to goods and services must also be considered.
The findings contribute to a new dimension of the minimum wage literature. Most studies
of minimum wage look at its effect on employment levels or other job characteristics. It is
theorized that higher income populations have better health outcomes. This exogenous
change in income which a minimum wage change represents is a useful method to examine
this theory and quantify the size of the effect.
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Table 1: Variables and Definitions
Variable Definition
General Health Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent reports their
health as very good or excellent
Sick Days Number of days that illness or injury kept you in bed for at least
half a day in the last year
Medical Provider Visit Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent has visited
a medical provider in the last year
Dental Provider Visit Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent has visited
a dental provider in the last year
Min. Wage Real minimum wage
High School D/O Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent did not
graduate high school
Medicaid Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent is covered
by medicaid
Medicare Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent is covered
by medicare
Private Insurance Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent is covered
by private insurance
Married Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent is married
Age Age of Respondent
Black Dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent is black
Household Income Household income in the survey month
Unemployment Rate State unemployment rate in a particular year
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Adults
All Adults Working Age Adults
Variable High Schl D/0 College Grad High Schl D/0 College Grad
Very Good Health or Better 0.34 0.73 0.43 0.77
(0.48) (0.44) (0.50) (0.42)
Sick Days 10.93 3.36 7.85 2.89
(46.01) (19.60) (35.76) (16.24)
Medical Provider Visit 0.72 0.84 0.63 0.82
(0.45) (0.37) (0.48) (0.38)
Hospital Stay 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.06
(0.35) (0.27) (0.30) (0.24)
Dental Provider Visit 0.34 0.78 0.35 0.78
(0.47) (0.41) (0.48) (0.41)
Medicaid 0.23 0.02 0.23 0.02
((0.42) (0.14) (0.42) (0.13)
Medicare 0.37 0.13 0.08 0.01
(0.48) (0.34) (0.26) (0.10)
Private Insurance 0.44 0.91 0.39 0.92
(0.50) (0.28) (0.49) (0.27)
Married 0.50 0.68 0.53 0.68
Age 52.86 46.52 41.35 42.47
Black 0.17 0.07 0.17 0.07
Male 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.48
Household Income 2775.46 7544.99 3065.67 7910.06
(2737.15) (6774.01) (2879.99) (6842.79)
Employed 0.42 0.79 0.58 0.87
Unemployment Rate 5.85 6.04 5.93 5.99
(1.89) (2.09) (1.92) (2.05)
Real Minimum Wage 4.77 4.83 4.78 4.82
(0.48) (0.53) (0.50) (0.53)
Observations (N) 90203 143026 59797 124369
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Younger Adults and Dependents
Adults Below Age 28 Children
Variable High Schl D/0 College Grad High Schl D/0 College Grad
Parents Parents
Very Good Health or Better 0.61 0.86 0.73 0.91
(0.49) (0.35) (0.44) (0.29)
Sick Days 3.68 1.98
(21.20) (9.66)
Medical Provider Visit 0.53 0.76 0.53 0.75
(0.50) (0.43) (0.50) (0.44)
Hospital Stay 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.30) (0.22) (0.20) (0.21)
Dental Provider Visit 0.34 0.69 0.39 0.63
(0.48) (0.46) (0.49) (0.48)
Medicaid 0.24 0.02 0.55 0.08
(0.43) (0.13) (0.50) (0.27)
Private Insurance 0.28 0.86 0.20 0.86
(0.47) (0.35) (0.40) (0.34)
Married 0.27 0.68
Age 22.46 24.89 7.66 7.52
Black 0.19 0.06 0.22 0.08
Male 0.54 0.42 0.51 0.51
Household Income 3245.98 6380.46 1979.45 7960.94
(3159.08) (5740.47) (1992.09) (6727.36)
Employed 0.59 0.87 0.77 0.98
Unemployment Rate 5.85 5.90 5.90 5.91
(1.79) (1.99) (1.81) (2.01)
Real Minimum Wage 4.75 4.80 4.78 4.80
(0.50) (0.52) (0.49) (0.52)
Observations (N) 12082 13269 19852 61788
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Table 4: Effect of Minimum Wage on General Health-Adults
High School Dropout
All Adults Working Age Adults Below Age 28
Minimum Wage -0.008 0.004 -0.038
(0.012) (0.015) (0.074)
Unemployed 0.001 0.112* 0.326***
(0.049) (0.056) (0.117)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed -0.006 -0.028** -0.065**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.023)
Individuals 40642 28532 7452
Observations 90203 59797 12082
College Graduate
All Adults Working Age Adults Below Age 28
Minimum Wage 0.014 0.011 0.029
(0.012) (0.013) (0.034)
Unemployed 0.010 -0.032 0.107
(0.049) (0.054) (0.147)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed -0.004 0.005 -0.027
(0.010) (0.011) (0.031)
Individuals 65789 57832 8310
Observations 143026 124369 13269
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following addi-
tional variables: age, age squared, dummy variables for marital status, and controls for Medicaid,
Medicare and private insurance coverage. individual and year fixed effects are also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 5: Effect of Minimum Wage on Sick Days-Adults
High School Dropout
All Adults Working Age Adults Below Age 28
Minimum Wage 0.009 -0.009 -0.287
(0.106) (0.129) (0.464)
Unemployed 0.089 -0.811 -0.926
(0.776) (0.797) (1.111)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed 0.034 0.229 0.216
(0.167) (0.169) (0.222)
Individuals 39307 27790 7341
Observations 83991 56566 11786
College Graduate
All Adults Working Age Adults Below Age 28
Minimum Wage -0.037 0.005 -0.199
(0.073) (0.080) (0.301)
Unemployed 0.527 0.764 -1.297
(0.564) (0.536) (1.212)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed -0.101 -0.142 0.309
(0.114) (0.110) (0.251)
Individuals 65228 57410 8269
Observations 140255 122349 13179
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following addi-
tional variables: age, age squared, dummy variables for marital status, and controls for Medicaid,
Medicare and private insurance coverage. individual and year fixed effects are also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 6: Effect of Minimum Wage on Medical Provider Visits-Adults
High School Dropout
All Adults Working Age Adults Below Age 28
Minimum Wage 0.026 0.042* 0.089**
(0.024) (0.022) (0.036)
Unemployed 0.059 -0.002 0.057
(0.053) (0.056) (0.127)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed -0.009 0.004 -0.009
(0.011) (0.012) (0.025)
Individuals 40642 28532 7452
Observations 90203 59797 12082
College Graduate
All Adults Working Age Adults Below Age 28
Minimum Wage 0.008 0.009 -0.039
(0.012) (0.011) (0.063)
Unemployed 0.012 -0.024 0.058
(0.057) (0.069) (0.180)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed -0.005 0.005 -0.009
(0.012) (0.011) (0.037)
Individuals 65789 57832 8310
Observations 143026 124369 13269
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following addi-
tional variables: age, age squared, dummy variables for marital status, and controls for Medicaid,
Medicare and private insurance coverage. individual and year fixed effects are also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 7: Effect of Minimum Wage on Hospital Stays-Adults
High School Dropout
All Adults Working Age Adults Below Age 28
Minimum Wage -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(0.013) (0.010) (0.044)
Unemployed 0.061 0.054 0.102
(0.042) (0.043) (0.123)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed -0.003 -0.002 -0.016
(0.009) (0.009) (0.025)
Individuals 40642 28532 6879
Observations 90203 59797 10961
College Graduate
All Adults Working Age Adults Below Age 28
Minimum Wage -0.003 0.003 0.017
(0.006) (0.005) (0.014)
Unemployed 0.086 0.111* 0.254*
(0.055) (0.058) (0.132)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed -0.012 -0.017 -0.042
(0.011) (0.011) (0.027)
Individuals 65789 57832 8310
Observations 143026 124369 13269
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following addi-
tional variables: age, age squared, dummy variables for marital status, and controls for Medicaid,
Medicare and private insurance coverage. individual and year fixed effects are also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 8: Effect of Minimum Wage on Dental Provider Visits-Adults
High School Dropout
All Adults Working Age Adults Below Age 28
Minimum Wage 0.003 0.003 0.111***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.040)
Unemployed 0.018 -0.009 0.053
(0.044) (0.056) (0.116)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed -0.005 0.001 -0.013
(0.010) (0.011) (0.023)
Individuals 40642 28532 7452
Observations 90203 59797 12082
College Graduate
All Adults Working Age Adults Below Age 28
Minimum Wage -0.003 0.002 -0.025
(0.008) (0.008) (0.052)
Unemployed 0.021 0.010 0.104
(0.039) (0.045) (0.147)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed -0.007 -0.006 -0.024
(0.008) (0.009) (0.030)
Individuals 65789 57832 8310
Observations 143026 124369 13269
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following addi-
tional variables: age, age squared, dummy variables for marital status, and controls for Medicaid,
Medicare and private insurance coverage. individual and year fixed effects are also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 9: Effect of Minimum Wage on General Health - Children
High School Dropout Parent College Graduate Parent
Minimum Wage 0.026 0.019
(0.040) (0.012)
Unemployed -0.183 -0.362*
(0.143) (0.205)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed 0.030 0.072*
(0.028) (0.040)
Individuals 10149 29831
Observations 19852 61788
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following additional
variables: age, age squared, controls for Medicaid and private insurance coverage. individual and year
fixed effects are also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 10: Effect of Minimum Wage on Medical Provider Visits - Children
High School Dropout Parent College Graduate Parent
Minimum Wage 0.044 -0.012
(0.042) (0.023)
Unemployed 0.075 -0.041
(0.175) (0.223)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed -0.010 0.022
(0.035) (0.043)
Individuals 10149 29831
Observations 19852 61788
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following additional
variables: age, age squared, controls for Medicaid and private insurance coverage. individual and year
fixed effects are also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 11: Effect of Minimum Wage on Hospital Stays - Children
High School Dropout Parent College Graduate Parent
Minimum Wage -0.025* 0.008
(0.014) (0.007)
Unemployed 0.028 -0.051
(0.075) (0.055)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed -0.004 0.007
(0.016) (0.011)
Individuals 10149 29831
Observations 19852 61788
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following additional
variables: age, age squared, controls for Medicaid and private insurance coverage. individual and year
fixed effects are also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 12: Effect of Minimum Wage on Dental Provider Visits - Children
High School Dropout Parent College Graduate Parent
Minimum Wage 0.094** 0.006
(0.045) (0.026)
Unemployed 0.298 0.244
(0.208) (0.277)
Minimum Wage*Unemployed -0.056 -0.048
(0.043) (0.050)
Individuals 10149 29831
Observations 19852 61788
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following additional
variables: age, age squared, controls for Medicaid and private insurance coverage. individual and year
fixed effects are also included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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Table 13: Effect of Minimum Wage on Employment Status
High School Dropout
All Adults Working Age Adults Below Age 28 Dependents
Minimum Wage -0.013 -0.020 -0.002 0.067*
(0.009) (0.014) (0.051) (0.039)
Unemployment Rate 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.014 0.018
(0.003) (0.005) (0.019) (0.018)
Individuals 40642 28532 7452 10149
Observations 90203 59797 12082 19852
College Graduate
All Adults Working Age Adults Below Age 28 Dependents
Minimum Wage 0.000 0.001 0.008 -0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.026) (0.005)
Unemployment Rate 0.005 0.006* 0.036** -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.002)
Individuals 65789 57832 8310 29831
Observations 143026 124369 13269 61788
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. All models include the following additional
variables: age, age squared and controls for marital status. Individual and year fixed effects are also
included.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level ** at the 5% level *** at the 1% level
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